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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we study a type of affine equivalence for the monomial rotation-symmetric
(MRS) Boolean functions and two new construction techniques for cryptographic Boolean
functions based on the affine equivalence of cryptographically strong base functions and
fast Boolean operations. Affine equivalence of cryptographic Boolean functions presents
a formidable challenge to researchers, due to its complexity and size of the search space.
We focus on an affine equivalence based on permutation of variables for MRS Boolean
functions and their relationship to circulant matrices over the binary field F2 and regular
graphs. We first establish a relationship between generalized inverses of circulant matri-
ces in F2 and their generating polynomials. We then apply the relationship to gain insight
into necessary conditions for the affine equivalence, based on permutations of variables for
MRS Boolean functions. We also propose a theoretical connection between regular graphs
and MRS Boolean functions to further our study in affine equivalence. Finally, we present
two constructions for Boolean functions with good cryptographic properties. The con-
structions take advantage of two affine-equivalent base functions with strong cryptographic
properties. We analyze the cryptographic properties of the constructions and demonstrate
an application with these base functions, called the hidden weighted-bit functions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As we connect to the Internet with increasing frequency for various services, the
need for secure communication is higher than ever before. The ability to email or socialize
electronically with the world in a secure and stable manner is crucial for today’s global
citizen. We want our financial transactions over the Internet to get processed without error.
Cyber warfare between nations and industrial espionage among corporations are common-
place. A nation’s infrastructure networks need impregnable protection. We are living in
a fast moving, networked world, and any compromised or misintended information may
result in catastrophic consequences. It is therefore a paramount requirement of every elec-
tronic communications network system that it provide every authorized user.
Due to the Internet revolution, the application of cryptography is no longer limited
to corporations or government agencies. Any entity on the Internet has the need to protect
information in storage and data in transit to another part of the network. This protection,
attained via complex (mostly mathematical) schemes called cryptosystems, is an integral
part of any reliable network service. At the heart of every cryptosystem is a cipher. A
cipher is a set of algorithms used to encrypt and decrypt a message. An encrypted message
in any language is called ciphertext, and an unencrypted message is called plaintext. In
general, there are two types of cryptosystems; asymmetric and symmetric. The security of
a modern electronic cipher often depends on secret keys that are essential for encryption
and decryption processes. An asymmetric cipher uses different keys to encrypt and decrypt
a message, and the connection between the encryption and decryption keys is based upon
a known (and well studied) mathematical problem. RSA (the initials of the surnames of
its designers, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman) is a well known asymmetric
cipher. Compared to symmetric ciphers, asymmetric ciphers are generally slow. However,
asymmetric ciphers have added more functionality, such as message authentication and
digital signature and are more efficient in secret-key management, since they require fewer
secret keys. A symmetric cipher uses the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt a message.
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It is faster than asymmetric cipher, but requires more secret keys, since each pair of users
on the network needs to have a unique key. This makes secret-key management a difficult
task. Depending on how a symmetric cipher processes a message before encryption or de-
cryption, a symmetric cipher can be further classified into a block or stream cipher. A block
cipher breaks down a message into 64, 128, 192 or 256 binary bit blocks and encrypts the
message by blocks. The decryption of a block cipher is usually accomplished by revers-
ing the encryption process. Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) are well known examples of block ciphers. On the other hand, a stream
cipher encrypts and decrypts a bit at a time. For example, GSM (Global System for Mobile
Communications), a wireless communications protocol, uses a stream cipher called A5/1.
The subject of this thesis, cryptographic Boolean functions, applies to both ciphers
— asymmetric and symmetric. Boolean functions can be key components to hashing al-
gorithms of asymmetric ciphers. Cryptographic Boolean functions can also be an element
for block cipher design and analysis. A good illustration of this is DES. Figure 1.1 shows
the DES encryption process. Despite all the seemingly complex procedures and diagrams,
the only nonlinear component in DES is the substitution process in the function f , which
uses a lookup table called substitution box or S-box to simply shuffle data. Surprisingly,
in DES, the S-boxes are the only component that integrates significant complexity to the
cipher. The S-box is the keystone of the security of DES. The same is true for AES. It is
possible to analyze an S-box with cryptographic Boolean functions and measure the secu-
rity of a block cipher against known attacks. We can also design another set of S-boxes for
DES, which optimizes certain cryptographic properties of Boolean functions [1].
The two important qualities of a cipher are security and speed. They often con-
flict with each other and affect the decision to choose the optimum cryptographic Boolean
functions for a cipher. The two broad topics of this thesis are the affine equivalence and
construction of Boolean functions with good cryptographic properties. A cryptographic
Boolean function of n variables takes an n dimensional Boolean vector and maps it to 0 or
1. Two Boolean functions are affine equivalent if we can obtain one from the other through
2
Figure 1.1: Data Encryption Standard (DES) Diagram From [2]
a set of affine transformations. By reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity, the affine equiv-
alence is an equivalence relation. Therefore, it partitions any set of Boolean functions into
equivalence classes. A cryptanalyst can take advantage of the partitioning to devise an ef-
ficient algorithm to test the security of a cipher. He needs only to consider the equivalence
classes instead of all possible Boolean functions for the cipher, since affine transformations
preserve many of the cryptographic properties. On the other hand, cryptographic engineers
can integrate affine equivalent functions with good cryptographic properties for speed and
simplicity. For example, instead of using the same function, they may use affine equiva-
lence classes of the function to increase security. They can also avoid the equivalence class
of a cryptographically weak function, since they are inherently a security risk. Affine equiv-
alence is notoriously complex and often requires unrealistic computing resources. In this
thesis, we focus on an affine equivalence of monomial rotation-symmetric (MRS) Boolean
functions. A rotation-symmetric Boolean function (RSBF) is a Boolean function such that
a Boolean vector and its rotation equivalents render the same function value. For example,
if a Boolean function f(x) is a RSBF of three variables x = (x1, x2, x3), then the vector
3
(0, 0, 1) and its rotation equivalents (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) have the same function value. In
other words, f((0, 0, 1)) = f((0, 0, 1)) = f((0, 0, 1)). RSBFs are well known for their
speed [3], and some cryptographically strong Boolean functions are rotation symmetric.
An MRS Boolean function is a special type of RSBF, which we formally define in Chapter
4. Construction techniques of cryptographic Boolean functions may be less relevant to the
ciphers, such as DES and AES, since they use key-invariant S-boxes. However, ciphers
such as BLOWFISH and TWOFISH use key-dependent S-boxes. Efficient construction
techniques for S-boxes can be a crucial part of the ciphers with dynamic S-boxes. We
study two techniques using affine equivalence of cryptographically strong base functions
and two simple Boolean operations, concatenation and complementation. These construc-
tions provide the flexibility to choose a customized base function with good cryptographic
properties, as well as speed due to the simplicity of the Boolean operations. We also present
an application of our methods, using the hidden weighted-bit function, which is resistant to
a binary decision diagram (BDD)-related attack.
The rest of the dissertation is outlined as follows.
In Chapter 2, we formally define basic terminology and principles of cryptographic
Boolean functions. We illustrate applications of cryptographic Boolean functions and re-
view common cryptographic properties.
In Chapter 3, we delve into circulant matrices and introduce some results regarding
the general inverse of circulant matrices. We study a necessary condition for an affine
equivalence based on a permutation of input variables for MRS Boolean functions.
In Chapter 4, we study the relationship between MRS Boolean functions and regular
graphs. We establish a basic relationship and suggest other possibilities.
In Chapter 5, we study two different ways to construct Boolean functions with good
cryptographic properties via affine transformation, concatenations, and complementations
of cryptographically strong base functions.
4
In Chapter 6, we briefly introduce BDD and cryptanalysis based on its properties.
We present an application based on hidden weighted-bit function for our construction meth-
ods. We analyze cryptographic properties of these constructions.
In Chapter 7, we summarize and reflect on the main contribution of this thesis. We
also suggest some ideas for future research.
5
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2. CHARACTERISTICS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOOLEAN
FUNCTIONS
2.1. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES
First, we introduce a commutative binary operation, “exclusive-or” or XOR, de-
noted by “
⊕





Table 2.1: Binary Operation XOR
We also define a multiplication in {0, 1} in the usual way. This operation is equiva-





Table 2.2: Binary Operation ·
We note that {0, 1} with ⊕ and · forms the smallest Galois field.
Definition 2.1.1. Let the set {0, 1} with the XOR operation and the usual multiplication
be the binary or Boolean field, denoted by F2. The set of n-tuples (x1, x2, . . . , xn), denoted
by Fn2 where xi ∈ F2 with 1 ≤ i ≤ n is an n dimensional vector space over F2.
We use the terms Boolean vectors and Boolean strings interchangeably. The Boolean
vector space has many common properties of other vector spaces, such as Rn and Cn.
We now proceed to define a Boolean function of n variables.
7
Definition 2.1.2. We define a Boolean function f of n variables as a mapping
f : Fn2 −→ F2.
A Boolean function f takes an n dimensional vector of 1’s and 0’s as input, and returns 1
or 0 as the function value. We denote the set of all Boolean functions of all variables as B,
and the set of all n variable Boolean functions as Bn. We use the terms “Boolean function
of n variables” and “Boolean function” interchangeably.
By applying the product rule of combinatorics, we observe that the domain of
f ∈ Bn has cardinality 2n. We usually order the domain in a lexicographical order. We
distinguish two types of lexicographical ordering, depending on how the elements of the
vector domain are ordered. One is the backward ordering, where we order the components
of the vector x such that x = (xn, xn−1, . . . , x2, x1). Therefore, the domain vectors are
lexicographically ordered such that (0, 0, . . . , 0, 0), (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1),...,(1, 1, . . . , 1, 1). The
other is the forward ordering, where we order the components of the vector x such that
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, xn). Therefore, the domain vectors are lexicographically ordered
such that (0, 0, . . . , 0, 0), (1, 0, . . . , 0, 0),...,(1, 1, . . . , 1, 1). When we say “lexicographical
order”, we mean the backward ordering, unless stated otherwise. For convenience, we
regard the vectors as row vectors and use forward ordering unless stated otherwise.
The most popular way to define a Boolean function of n variable is to list the
function values as they match the lexicographically ordered domain, which results in a
2n dimensional Boolean vector or string. The first column of Table 2.3 depicts a Boolean
function of 3 variables, f(x) with its truthtable 10011101.
Remark 2.1.3. For convenience, we note that f means the truth table representation of a
Boolean function f , and f(x) means the function value at the particular vector x.
Definition 2.1.4. Given a Boolean function f , the complement of f , denoted by f¯ , is f⊕1.
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We observe that f¯ merely flips or changes the function values of f . That is, if
f(x) = 1, then f¯(x) = 0, and if f(x) = 0, then f¯(x) = 1. The complement of the function
on Table 2.3 is 01100010.
Lemma 2.1.5. f ⊕ f = 0, and f ⊕ f¯ = 1 where 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
Remark 2.1.6. For convenience, we use string and vector notations interchangeably in this
thesis. For example, 10011101 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1).
By the product rule of combinatorics, there are 22n Boolean functions of n variables.
Another operation commonly used in Fn2 is concatenation.
Definition 2.1.7. Given two Boolean vectors, f = a1a2 . . . am and g = b1b2 . . . bn with
ai, bj ∈ F2 and m and n in N, the concatenation of f and g, denoted by f ‖ g, is an m+ n
vector obtained by simply combining the elements of f and g in order. That is,
f ‖ g = a1a2 . . . amb1b2 . . . bn.
Example 2.1.8. Table 2.3 shows the various expression of a Boolean function. It is inter-
esting to note that f = 1001 ‖ 1101, where 1001, 1101 ∈ B2 and f ∈ B3.
Another way to express the truth table is to take −1 to the power of the function
value. This set up gives us more options to aggregate some Boolean measures in R.
Definition 2.1.9. Given the truth table of a Boolean function f(x), we define the character
form or sign function [4, p. 6] of f(x), denoted by fˆ(x)
fˆ(x) = (−1)f(x).
It is clear that fˆ(x) ∈ {−1, 1}, and also fˆ(x) = 1− 2 · f(x).
The second column of Table 2.3 depicts a Boolean function of 3 variables f(x),
as −1, 1, 1,−1,−1,−1, 1,−1 in sign function. The next lemma describes the relationship
between the truth table and the sign function.
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Lemma 2.1.10. [4, p. 6] If f, g ∈ Bn and h = f ⊕ g, then hˆ = fˆ gˆ.
We call a multiplication term of Boolean variables, regardless of the power of each
variable, a monomial. For example, x1 · x02 · x3 = x1x3 is a monomial. Given x =
(xn, . . . , x1) with xi = {0, 1} and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we observe that
(xi)
k = xi · xi · . . . · xi = xi,
for k ∈ N. We can write a polynomial-like expression for Boolean functions, using mono-
mials and ⊕. When we list the all the possible monomials in lexicographical order, we can
regard the set of all the Boolean functions of n variables as the set of the all possible XOR-
combinations of n variable monomials. We can also assign a unique 2n dimensional vector
over F2 to all possible monomials to write an XOR combination of n variable monomials
in the following way.
Definition 2.1.11. The algebraic normal form (ANF) of a Boolean function f(x) is an





cj · xa11 xa22 · · ·xann ,
where a = (a1, a2, . . . an), c = (c1, c2, . . . , c2n), and ai, cj ∈ F2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , orn
and j = 1, 2, . . . , or 2n.
Example 2.1.12. The expression below illustrates the ANF of f(x) below. Typically, we
order the vector a lexicographically and obtain binary string f(x) = 0001000000001000
of length 2n long.
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f(x) = x1x2 ⊕ x3x4
= 0 · x01x02x03x04 ⊕ 0 · x11x02x03x04 ⊕ 0 · x01x12x03x04 ⊕ 1 · x11x12x03x04 ⊕ 0 · x01x02x13x04 ⊕ · · ·
· · · ⊕ 1 · x01x02x13x14 ⊕ . . .⊕ 0 · x11x12x13x04 ⊕ 0 · x11x12x13x14.
We also note that the ANF of a Boolean function is unique.
A Boolean function may be better understood with one expression type of f(x) than an-
other. We transform an ANF of a Boolean function f(x) to the truth table of f(x) by
simply evaluating the function value with the ANF. We can transform a truth table in Table
2.3 into an ANF expression by adding the monomials derived by the input values x such
that f(x) = 1. We demonstrate this process in the next example.
Example 2.1.13. The truth table of the Boolean function, f(x) on Table 2.3 is 10100111,
where f(000) = f(010) = f(101) = f(110) = f(111) = 1. We construct each term to
ensure that f(x) = 1 whenever x happens to be one of the vectors listed. For example,
since f(011) = 1, we want to have the term x1x2(x3⊕ 1) for x1 = 1, x2 = 1, x3 = 0. And
we apply this to each x with f(x) = 1 to obtain
f(x) = (x3 ⊕ 1)(x2 ⊕ 1)(x1 ⊕ 1)⊕ (x3 ⊕ 1)x2x1 ⊕ x3(x2 ⊕ 1)x1
⊕x3x2(x1 ⊕ 1)⊕ x3x2x1
= 1⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x1 · x3 ⊕ x1 · x2 · x3.
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n = 3 f(x) fˆ(x) ANF (f(x))
000 1 -1 1
001 0 1 1
010 0 1 1
011 1 -1 0
100 1 -1 0
101 1 -1 1
110 0 1 0
111 1 -1 1
Table 2.3: Various Representation of a Boolean function f(x)
There is a more efficient way to construct the ANF from the truth table (and vice
versa), called transeunt triangle, and we refer to [5].
Definition 2.1.14. The ANF of a Boolean function gives us some important measures on
the function. In an ANF, the number of variables in the highest-order monomial with
nonzero coefficient is called the degree of the Boolean function. A Boolean function is
homogeneous if all its ANF terms have the same degree. A Boolean function is nonhomo-
geneous if it is not homogeneous.
Example 2.1.15. The function in Example 2.1.12 is a homogeneous Boolean function with
degree 2, whereas the function below is a nonhomogeneous Boolean function with degree
5.
f(x) = x1x2 ⊕ x1x2x3x4x5.
The degree of a Boolean function is one of the most important cryptographic proper-
ties in a cipher. We discuss the cryptographic implications of the degree in the next section.
A Boolean function of degree “at most, one” is an affine function. An affine function with
the constant term equal to zero is called a linear function. The set of all n variable affine
(respectively linear) functions is denoted by An (respectively Ln).
Let f ∈ Bn and E be any flat (that is, a coset of a vector subspace). If the restriction
f |E of f to E is constant (respectively affine), then E is called a constant (respectively
affine) flat for f .
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Let
1f = {x ∈ Fn2 |f(x) = 1}
be the support of a Boolean function f . We define the complement of the support
0f = {x ∈ Fn2 |f(x) = 0}.
We also note the usual dot-product operation of two vectors in the context of Boolean
vectors. Let x = (xn, . . . , x1) and w = (wn, . . . , w1) both belonging to Fn2 and x · w =
xnwn ⊕ . . .⊕ x1w1.
Definition 2.1.16. The number of 1’s in a binary string or vector x denoted by wt(x), is
called the Hamming weight.
We can apply the same idea to the truth table of a Boolean function f . The Ham-
ming weight of f is the Hamming weight of the truth table of f . The Hamming weight of
the Boolean function on Table 2.3 is 5. We also observe that the cardinality of 1f is the
Hamming weight of f .









Definition 2.1.18. Given two binary vectors (or strings) of same length, x = (x1, x2, . . . xn)
and y = (y1, y2, . . . yn). The Hamming distance, denoted by d(x,y), between the two vec-
tors is the number of indices where they have different binary values.
For example, if x = (0, 1, 0,0,0,0,0) and y = (1,1,1,1,1,1,0), d(x,y) = 5 since the
elements of x and y are different in the indices 1, 3, 4, 5, 6.
Lemma 2.1.19. Given two Boolean functions of n variables f = x1, x2, . . . xk and g =
y1, y2, . . . , yk in truth table, d(f, g) = wt(f ⊕ g).
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Lemma 2.1.20. For two Boolean functions f and g,
d(f, g) = 2n−1 − 1
2
fˆ ·ˆg.
Next, we introduce an important measure of Boolean functions.
Definition 2.1.21. [4, p. 7] Given a Boolean function f , the Walsh transform of f on a












Another way to measure a Boolean function is the Walsh transform of fˆ on w, denoted by









The Walsh transform of f on w essentially measures the Hamming distance be-
tween f and the linear function defined by the vector w, which is
w · x = w1x1 ⊕ w2x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wnxn.
We use this result to define the nonlinearity of a Boolean function in the next section.
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Next, we discuss a concept analogous to a “directional derivative” [4, p. 38]. Given
a Boolean function f(x) and an arbitrary vector u, we can consider a measure on f(x) with
respect to a vector u.
Definition 2.1.22. Given a Boolean function f , the derivative of f with respect to a vector
u, denoted by Duf , is defined by
Duf = f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ u).
If f(x) = f(x ⊕ u), Duf = 0. If f(x) 6= f(x ⊕ u), Duf = 1. Therefore,∑
x∈Fn2
Duf(x) counts the number of input values in which function values change when the
change in direction of u is applied. We can apply the same idea to fˆ and obtain Dufˆ =
fˆ(x)fˆ(x ⊕ u), so that Dufˆ ∈ {−1, 1}. When we aggregate Dufˆ over x ∈ Fn2 , we have
the following definition for measuring how sensitive a Boolean function is in the domain.
Definition 2.1.23. [4, p. 8] The autocorrelation function of f ∈ Bn with respect to u ∈ Fn2 ,









We note that Cfˆ (0) = 2
n.
The autocorrelation function measures the overall change of f as a result of the shift
or change caused by a vector u in the domain. We argue that if the overall change is half
of 2n, the statistical impact of the shift of u is zero. This notion gives us a cryptographic
property called the strict avalanche criterion (SAC), a concept invented by Webster and
Tavares and published in Crypto 85, which we elaborate in the next section. We can apply
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a similar idea to the autocorrelation function of two Boolean functions and measure how
they are related to each other with respect to a vector.
Definition 2.1.24. [4, p. 8] The correlation between two Boolean functions f and g is
defined by
C(f, g) = 1− d(f, g)
2n−1
.
The correlation function between f and g with respect to u ∈ Fn2 is an integer





S-boxes of block ciphers may employ multiple cryptographic Boolean functions.
We want to reduce the correlation between functions as well as the autocorrelation function
values of each function used, to minimize the risk of a correlation attack.
The concept of a derivative gives us another interesting measure of a cryptographic
function, namely linear structure.
Definition 2.1.25. [6], [7] If the derivative of f ∈ Bn in respect to the u ∈ Fn2 , Duf is
constant, then u is a linear structure of f . If the linear structures of f form a subspace in
Fn2 , we call this subspace a linear space of f .
Depending on the constant derivative, we can further classify a linear structure u
into two types 0−linear structure, denoted byLS0(f) ifDuf = 0, and 1−linear structure,
denoted by LS1(f) if Duf = 1.




In [9], the concept of linear structure was used to show that the strict avalanche
criterion is local in the sense of a derivative, and may not be enough to protect a block
cipher from a statistical attack.
2.2. APPLICATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
In this section, we briefly comment on some applications of cryptographic Boolean
functions. Boolean functions are typically used for the construction of S-boxes for block
ciphers, nonlinear filters for a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), nonlinear combiners
for multiple LFSRs in a stream cipher, or hashing functions in an asymmetric cipher.
2.2.1. Block Ciphers
A block cipher breaks down the text into blocks of some size, and enciphers and de-
ciphers it block by block. Boolean functions play a crucial role in analyzing and designing
block ciphers. The two prominent techniques to design a block cipher are Feistel ciphers
and substitution permutation networks (SPNs). Regardless of the scheme, it uses substitu-
tion boxes or S-boxes. For example, DES uses eight fixed S-boxes, which convert a six-bit
input string to a four-bit string. Table 2.4 shows the first S-box of DES, which consists
of four lookup tables numbered 0 through 15. Each row can be represented by a vecto-
rial Boolean function, F (x) : F42 → F42, which can be composed with four four-variable
Boolean functions. Each function takes a six-bit string and extracts the first and the last bit
to determine which row of the table to use. Then, the middle four bits process through the
vectorial function to output the substitution value. Table 2.5 shows the Boolean represen-
tation of the first S-box, and Table 2.6 lists the four cryptographic Boolean functions for
the first row of the first S-box.
Typically, S-boxes are the only nonlinear features in a block cipher. Without non-
linear S-boxes, almost all block ciphers could be solved with little effort. Therefore, when
designing an S-box for a block cipher, we must consider known relevant cryptographic
characteristics of S-boxes to optimize their security. In [1], a complete set of replacement
S-boxes for DES based on Boolean functions is presented.
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Row\Col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 14 4 13 1 2 15 11 8 3 10 6 12 5 9 0 7
1 0 15 7 4 14 2 13 1 10 6 12 11 9 5 3 8
2 4 1 14 8 13 6 2 11 15 12 9 7 3 10 5 0
3 15 12 8 2 4 9 1 7 5 11 3 14 10 0 6 13
Table 2.4: 1st S-box of DES in Decimal From [4, p. 170]
Row\Col 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111
00 1110 0100 1101 0001 0010 1111 1011 1000
01 0000 1111 0111 0100 1110 0010 1101 0001
10 0100 0001 1110 1000 1101 0110 0010 1011
11 1111 1100 1000 0010 0100 1001 0001 0111
Row\Col 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111
00 0011 1010 0110 1100 0101 1001 0000 0111
01 1010 0110 1100 1011 1001 0101 0011 1000
10 1111 1100 1001 0111 0011 1010 0101 0000
11 0101 1011 0011 1110 1010 0000 0110 1101
Table 2.5: 1st S-box of DES in Binary
Col Boolean Function (ANF and Truth Table)
1
1⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ x1x2x3 ⊕ x2x3x4
1010011101010100
2
1⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x4 ⊕ x1x2x4
1110010000111001
3
1⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x1x4 ⊕ x2x4 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ x1x3x4 ⊕ x2x3x4
1000111011100001
4
x2 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x1x4 ⊕ x1x2x4
0011011010001101
Table 2.6: Boolean Function Representation of the First Row of the First S-box of DES
The S-boxes in DES are predetermined and typically implemented as a lookup table
for simplicity. However, block ciphers, such as BLOWFISH [10] and TWOFISH [11], do




A stream cipher encrypts a plaintext bit by bit with secret-key stream bits. In gen-
eral, an XOR operation of a plaintext bit and secret-key stream bit results in a ciphertext bit.
A stream cipher integrates pseudo-random bit generators (PRBG) to produce a key stream.
In electronic circuits, a shift resister is a sequential logic circuit for storage of binary data.
It is set up in a linear fashion such that the stored data is shifted to a predetermined direction
when the circuit is on. A linear-feedback shift register (LFSR) is a shift register which takes
the output of a linear function of two or more bits from its previous state [4, p. 19]. We
assume an LFSR has n ≥ 1 variables. Table 2.7 shows the LFSR sequence generated by
the Boolean function of 4 variables, x1 ⊕ x4 with the initial vector x = x1x2x3x4 = 0101.
For example, from the initial vector, x1 = 0 and x4 = 1. Therefore, x1 ⊕ x4 = 0⊕ 1 = 1.
This feedback sets the next x1 = 1, and the previous x1, x2, and x3 shift to x2, x3, and x4,
respectively, which sets the next state, x = x1x2x3x4 = 1010. It repeats this process until
the LFSR obtains the initial vector again. The number of steps needed to reach the initial
vector is called the cycle of an LFSR. We note that the LFSR on Table 2.7 has a cycle of
24 − 1 = 15, which is the maximum cycle possible.
Figure 2.1: LFSR of x1 = x1 ⊕ x4
We can integrate a nonlinear filter or an n variable Boolean function with good
cryptographic properties to generate secure key streams.
One way to construct a PRBG is to combine LFSRs and cryptographic Boolean
functions. We consider two applications of cryptographic Boolean functions in stream
ciphers: a nonlinear filter and a nonlinear combiner. In the nonlinear filter setup, an LFSR
and a cryptographic Boolean function as a nonlinear filter can generate a secret-key stream.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 Output
0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
x1 x2 x3 x4 Output
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1
Table 2.7: Bit Stream Generated by LFSR of x1 = x1 ⊕ x4 with Initial Vector 0101
As the LFSR shifts through the states, the nonlinear filter processes n variables from each
state and outputs a key bit. Table 2.2 illustrates this process.
Figure 2.2: Nonlinear Filter
Turing is a stream cipher developed for CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access),
which is a wireless communication protocol developed by Qualcomm [12]. Turing gener-
ates 160 bits of output in each round by applying a nonlinear filter to the internal state of
an LFSR [13]. In the nonlinear combiner setup, an n variable Boolean function with good
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cryptographic properties takes n output bits, each from n distinct LFSRs, and outputs a
secret stream bit. Figure 2.3 illustrates a nonlinear combiner of n LFSRs. An example for
this setup is A5/2, which is the stream cipher used to encrypt voice transmissions in the
GSM cellular telephone network. A5/2 is based on four LFSRs and a nonlinear combiner.
Figure 2.3: Nonlinear Combiner
2.2.3. Hash Functions
Some secure communications protocols and asymmetric ciphers use hash functions
to ensure authenticity, integrity, and nonrepudiation of a message. A hashing function can
be integrated into a secure communication system to detect an unauthorized modification or
tampering. Secure email systems can employ a digital-signature scheme that uses hashing
functions to ensure the reliability of a message. Since a hashing function does not require a
decryption or recovery of the original message, in a software-based implementation we can
use a fast Boolean function with good cryptographic properties. Some candidates for this
purpose are symmetric and rotation-symmetric Boolean functions, since we can evaluate
them faster due to their simple structures. A Boolean function is symmetric if vectors with
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x 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111
f(x): Symmetric 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
g(x): RSBF 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
x 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111
f(x): Symmetric 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
g(x): RSBF 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Table 2.8: Comparison of a Symmetric and Rotation-Symmetric Boolean Function
the same Hamming weight have the same function value. A Boolean function is rotation
symmetric if the function renders the same function value for an input vector and its rotation
equivalents.
Table 2.8 illustrates the symmetric and rotation-symmetric functions. The function
f(x) is symmetric, since has the same function values for the vectors with each Hamming
weight. The function g(x) is rotation symmetric, since each vector and its rotation equiva-
lents have the same function values. We note that if a function is symmetric, then it is also
rotation symmetric. However, the converse of the previous statement is not true, since a
rotation equivalent of a vector with a Hamming weight k and a non-rotation equivalent of
the vector with the same Hamming weight may have different function values in a rotation-
symmetric function. We give a proper definition of rotation-symmetric Boolean functions
and their properties in the next chapter.
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
In [14], Shannon establishes two important principles in designing a cipher: confu-
sion and diffusion. He introduces the principle of confusion to ensure that the relationship
between the ciphertext and the encryption or decryption key is complex and complicated
as possible, and the principle of diffusion to ensure the plaintexts are dissipated into the
space of ciphertext. Most cryptographic characteristics discussed here are well studied and
address Shannon’s confusion and diffusion principles in a cipher. We review some well-
studied characteristics and outline significance of the corresponding property.
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2.3.1. Balancedness
A Boolean function f ∈ Bn is balanced if the truth table of f has 2n−1 zeros and
2n−1 ones. We observe that if f is balanced wt(f) = 2n−1. A balanced Boolean function
counters statistics-based attacks and correlation attacks. We can measure how close the
Boolean function is to a balanced one by the following measure.





The correlation between f(x) and the constant function f(x) = 0 or 1 is −1 ≤ If
2n
≤ 1.
A balanced function f has zero correlation to a constant function, since If = 0. The
balancedness can be checked by the Walsh–Hadamard transform as shown in the lemma
below.
Lemma 2.3.2. A Boolean function f is balanced if and only if Wf (0) = 0.
2.3.2. Algebraic Degree




cj · xa11 xa22 · · · xann as in Defi-
nition 2.1.11. The algebraic degree of f(x) is the largest number of variables in a term
cj · xa11 xa22 · · ·xann with ai = cj = 1 with i = 1, 2, . . . n. We denote the algebraic degree of
f ∈ Bn as deg(f). Using interpolation cryptanalysis [16] and high-order differential crypt-
analysis [17], a cryptanalyst can carry out an effective attack on some ciphers employing
low-degree Boolean functions.
2.3.3. Nonlinearity
The use of affine Boolean functions in a cipher is undesirable, due to the simple
algebraic structure of affine functions. We want to use Boolean functions that are far away
from an affine function, which gives us the following measure.
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Definition 2.3.3. [4, p. 7] LetAn be a set of all affine Boolean functions of n variables. The
nonlinearity of a Boolean function, denoted by nl(f) is the minimum Hamming distance
between f and any function in An.
Theorem 2.3.4. [4, p. 13] For f ∈ Bn,





The following upper limit for the nonlinearity is well known (see Seberry and Zhang
[18]).
Theorem 2.3.5. [18] For f ∈ Bn,
nl(f) ≤ 2n−1 − 2n/2−1.
We observe that 2n/2−1 in Theorem 2.3.5 is not an integer if n is odd. If n is even,
we have a special family of functions, called bent functions, that achieve the nonlinearity
bound.
Definition 2.3.6. Let f ∈ Bn and n be even. Then f is a bent function if
nl(f) ≤ 2n−1 − 2n/2−1.
If n is odd with n = 2k + 1, k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the bent concatenation bound is defined as
22k − 2k.
It is known that the algebraic degree of a bent function is bounded above by n
2
[4,
p. 80]. The r-order nonlinearity, denoted by nlr(f), is its distance from the set of all n
variable functions of algebraic degrees at most r. A Boolean function needs to have higher
r-order nonlinearity to resist a fast algebraic attack [19]. We can also devise a statistical
measure using nonlinearity.
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2.3.4. Avalanche and Propagation Criteria
2.3.4.1. Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC)
The strict avalanche criterion is one of the cryptographic characteristics that
cover the diffusion principle. The main point is that when we change an element of the
input vector, we want the effect of the change equally distributed throughout the truth
table. This idea was first introduced by Webster and Tavares in [21]. Given f(x) ∈ Bn
and an input x = (x1x2, . . . , xn), if we select an xk in x with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, then we
can envision the domain Fn2 as two equivalence classes, A = {(x1, . . . , xn)|xk = 0} and
B = {(x1, . . . , xn)|xk = 1}. We note that there are 2n−1 unique pairs (x,y) with x ∈ A
and y ∈ B such that xi = yi with i = 1, 2, . . . n except for when i = k. Without loss of
generality, assume xk = 0. As xk changes from 0 to 1, some pairs have the same function
values (are not affected by the change), and the others have their function values changed
from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0. The Boolean function f satisfies the SAC, if exactly half of the pairs
change their function values for all k.
Example 2.3.8. [4, p. 25] In Table 2.9, if we fix x2 = 0, we have f(000) = 1, f(001) = 1,
f(100) = 0, and f(101) = 1. When x2 becomes 1, we have f(010) = 1, f(011) = 0,
f(110) = 1, and f(111) = 1. We observe that as x2 changes from 0 to 1, f(0x20) and
f(1x21) do not change, but f(0x21) and f(1x20) change. We can check x1 and x2 in a
similar manner and observe the same result. Therefore, f satisfies the SAC.
The next lemma is a well-known equivalent statement to the definition of
the SAC.
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x 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
f(x) 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Table 2.9: A 3-variable Function Which Satisfies the SAC
Lemma 2.3.9. [21] A Boolean function f satisfies the SAC if and only if Cfˆ (w) = 0 for all
wt(w) = 1 where w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Using Lemma 2.3.9, we can develop a computational tool to verify if a
Boolean function satisfies the SAC.
2.3.4.2. Propagation Criteria
The concept of the propagation criterion generalizes the SAC. Preneel et al.
[22] first introduced this idea.
Definition 2.3.10. [4, p. 38] A Boolean function f satisfies the propagation criterion of
degree k or PC(k) if changing the value of any i elements of the input vector with 1 ≤ i ≤
k ≤ n changes exactly the half of the function values of the affected vectors.
We can extend Lemma 2.3.9 to cover the PC(k) functions.
Lemma 2.3.11. A Boolean function f satisfies PC(k) if and only if Cfˆ (w) = 0 for all
wt(w) = m where w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) and 1 ≤ m ≤ k.
2.3.5. Global Avalanche Criterion (GAC)
In [9], Zhang and Zheng first introduced the concept of GAC. They noted that the
functions with SAC provide some level of security, but the SAC is only “local” and does
not cover all possible linear structures in a Boolean function. PC(k) on the other hand
covers all possibilities. It seems that a large k implies better security. However, when k
is even and k = n, the function is a bent function. Despite the highest nonlinearity, a
bent function is not balanced. To address these issues, they introduced GAC, in which we
measure the avalanche effects throughout all possible n-variable Boolean vectors using the
two measures below.
26
Definition 2.3.12. [9] Given a Boolean function f(x), the sum-of-squares indicator for the















Some cryptographic properties conflict with one another. In this case we see three
conflicting properties, namely balance, nonlinearity, and propagation criteria. The GAC
provides us with two general measures that we can minimize.
2.3.6. Correlation Immunity and Resilience
Given some Boolean function values f(x), an attacker may guess the relationship
between the elements of input, xi of x = (x1, x2, . . . xn) and f(x). Therefore, we want to
engineer a principle into our function to deal with this kind of situation. Siegenthaler [23]
first conceived the notion of correlation immunity to address this issue.
Definition 2.3.13. [4, p. 49] Let xc1, xc2, . . . xci of x = (x1, x2, . . . xn) be any i variables
with i ≤ k of input x. A Boolean function f(x) ∈ Bn has correlation immunity of order
k, denoted by CI(k), if given f(x), the probability of xc1, xc2, . . . xci being certain value
is 2−i. In other words, f(x) is statistically independent with respect to any subset of k
variables. In particular, f(x) is called a resilient function of order k if it is CI(k) and
balanced.
Example 2.3.14. The Boolean function in the Table 2.10 has CI(1). For example, if
f(x) = 0 and xi = x1, we can compute the conditional probability with xi = 0,
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the conditional probability with xi = 1,









The same procedures can check for xi = x2, x3 to conclude that the function has
CI(1). However, we observe that
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Therefore, f(x) does not have CI(2).
x 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
f(x) 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Table 2.10: A three-variable function with CI(1)
There is an efficient way to verify CI using the Walsh-Hadamard transform.





for all w where 1 ≤ wt(w) ≤ k.
2.3.7. Algebraic Immunity
For decades, linearization and some of its variations have been used to attack a
stream cipher employing a Boolean function. They typically use Gaussian elimination as a
core algorithm. By choosing a Boolean function with a high degree, we can substantially
increase the computing resources needed to carry out an attack, which renders linearization
useless as a practical technique to solve a stream cipher. However, a new class of attack
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was introduced in 2003. It was shown that if a stream cipher employs a Boolean function
f or f ⊕ 1 with a low-degree function such that fg = 0 or (f ⊕ 1)g = 0, the cipher can be
methodically solved by the algebraic attack discussed in [24] and [25].
Definition 2.3.16. For any f ∈ Bn, a nonzero function g ∈ Bn is called an annihilator of
f if fg = 0, and the algebraic immunity of f , denoted by AI(f), is the minimum value of
d such that f or f ⊕ 1 admits an annihilator of degree d [26].
The following two cases are algebraic attack possibilities [24].
Case 1: Assume that there exists a function g of low algebraic degree such that
fg = h, where h is a nontrivial function with low algebraic degree.
Case 2: Assume that there exists a function g of low algebraic degree such that
fg = 0. In 2003, Courtois and Meier showed that the algebraic immunity of an n variable
Boolean function is bounded above by dn
2
e.
Remark 2.3.17. [27] While algebraic immunity is an important cryptographic property, it
is not enough to resist fast algebraic attacks, a more efficient form of algebraic attacks. If
we can find g of low degree and h of algebraic degree not much larger than n/2, such that
fg = h, then f is susceptible to fast algebraic attacks [24], [28].
2.3.8. Normality
The normality was first discussed by Dobbertin while examining bent functions
in [29]. Since the number of variables in a bent function is even, the initial focus was
on the even variable functions, which are invariant with respect to the vectors in a flat.




. Later this concept was generalized for odd variable functions invariant in
a flat of dimension dn
2
e. Dobbertin conjectured that all bent functions are normal. However,
some non-normal bent functions were discovered by Canteaut el al. [30], and the notion
of normality became an independent measure for general Boolean functions. Later, it was
shown that there are very few normal functions, and the definition below was established
by Carlet [31].
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Definition 2.3.18. A Boolean function f ∈ Bn is called k-normal if there exist a k dimen-
sional flatG such that f is constant. We denote such condition as f |G= 0 or 1. If k = dn
2
e,
f is simply called a normal function.
General information on the normality can be found in [32].
2.4. TRADEOFFS BETWEEN CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROPERTIES
Unfortunately, composing or finding good cryptographic Boolean functions has a
few obstacles, since there are some cryptographic properties that we cannot optimize si-
multaneously. We present common dilemmas among cryptographic properties with the
relevant theorems.
2.4.1. Correlation Immunity and Degree
In 1984, Siegenthaler [23] showed that there is a necessary tradeoff between achiev-
ing high-degree and high-correlation immunity.
Theorem 2.4.1. [23, Theorem 1] If a Boolean function f is CI(k), then the degree of f is
at most n − k. If f is CI(k) with k < n − 1 and balanced, then the degree of f is at most
n− k − 1.
2.4.2. Correlation Immunity and Nonlinearity
Theorem 2.4.2 illustrates the tradeoff between correlation immunity and nonlinear-
ity of Boolean functions.
Theorem 2.4.2. [33] If a Boolean function f is CI(k) with k ≤ n− 2,
nl(f) ≤ 2n−1 − 2k+1.
We can combine Theorems 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 and obtain the following theorems.
Theorem 2.4.3. [4, p. 71] If f is balanced and CI(k) with k ≤ n − 2, then equality is
possible in Theorem 2.4.2 only if f has its maximum possible degree n− k − 1.
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If deg(f) < n− k − 1, then
nl(f) ≤ 2n−1 − 2k+2.
The following theorem by Carlet improves Theorem 2.4.3 to incorporate the degree
of the function in the upperbound [4, p. 72].
Theorem 2.4.4. [34] If a balanced Boolean function f with degree d is CI(k) with k ≤
n− 2, then
nl(f) ≤ 2n−1 − 2k+1+b(n−k−2)/dc.
2.4.3. Algebraic Immunity and Nonlinearity
The following theorem describes the limit (commonly called “Lobanov’s bound”).
The theorem implies that we can increase the algebraic immunity of a function along with
the nonlinearity, but at the expense of decreasing the correlation immunity due to Theorem
2.4.2.










3. AFFINE EQUIVALENCE OF MONOMIAL
ROTATION-SYMMETRIC BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
3.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we study the affine equivalence of monomial rotation-symmetric
(MRS) Boolean functions. A general affine equivalence problem for Boolean functions is
a complete partitioning of the n-variable Boolean function space based on an affine equiv-
alence relation. A greedy algorithm for affine equivalence verification requires checking
all elements of GLn(F2), and has computational complexity O(2n
2
). This implies that
if n ≥ 7, the problem becomes quite a challenge for current computing platforms. The
first notable effort to solve an affine equivalence problem is found in [36], published in
1964. Berlekamp and Welch [37] in 1972 found all equivalence classes for all five vari-
able Boolean functions. In 1991, Maiorana [38] computed 150, 357 equivalence classes
of six variable Boolean functions. Due to its complexity and size, affine equivalence still
remains a tough problem to deal with, especially for a general solution, which addresses
any n ∈ N. Besides the pure mathematical perspective, an affine equivalence can be ap-
plied to cryptanalysis and cryptographic engineering. For example, differential and linear
cryptanalyses are two major techniques to solve the S-boxes of block ciphers. If an S-
box is vulnerable to differential or linear cryptanalysis, so are the S-boxes realizing affine
equivalence functions. This fact simplifies the tasks of cryptanalysts, since they just need
to choose and analyze an (easy) representative of an equivalence class. On the other hand,
the cryptographic engineers may take advantage of affine equivalent S-boxes of a S-box
that is strongly resistant to these attacks, since affine transformations have small delays and
preserve much of the cryptographic properties of the original function.
A rotation-symmetric Boolean function (RSBF) is invariant under the rotation or
circular shift of a input. For example, if f ∈ B3 is rotation symmetric, then f(001) =
f(010) = f(100), f(011) = f(101) = f(110), and so on. Since an RSBF uses re-
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Table 3.1: Affine Equivalence Classes in Bn
peated function values, it is relatively fast. However, despite being seemingly simple func-
tions to evaluate, the class of RSBFs contain many functions richly endowed with good
cryptographic properties. For example, the famous Patterson–Wiedemann function in B15
[39] that achieves nonlinearity 16276, which is strictly greater than the bent concatenation
bound, 215−1 − 2(15−1)/2 = 16256 is rotation symmetric [4, p. 112]. Moreover, Kavut et
al. [40], [41], [42] proved that there exist rotation-symmetric functions of nine variables
with the nonlinearity 241 and 242, which is also strictly greater than the bent concatenation
bound 29−1 − 2(9−1)/2 = 240 [4, p. 112]. Due to their speed and the prospect of being
good cryptographic Boolean functions, RSBFs have received a lot of attention from cryp-
tographic researchers. In [43], Filiol and Fontaine initially studied cryptographic properties
of RSBFs (they used the term, “idempotent” function instead of RSBF), mainly focusing
on nonlinearity [4, p. 112]. Later, the nonlinearity and correlation immunity of RSBFs
were studied thoroughly in [44], [45], [46], [47], and [48]. The RSBF’s speed and poten-
tial to have good cryptographic properties make them suitable for such an application as
hashing algorithms. Pieprzyk and Qu studied the use of RSBFs in a hashing algorithm in
[3]. We note the papers [49] and [50] dealing with algebraic immunity of RSBF. The class
of RSBFs are interesting to apply the notion of affine equivalence into, as the function
space is much smaller (≈ 2 2nn ) than the total space of Boolean functions (22n), and the
set contains functions with very good cryptographic properties. It has been experimentally
demonstrated that there are RSBFs that are simultaneously good in terms of balancedness,
nonlinearity, correlation immunity, algebraic degree, and algebraic immunity.
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There has been consistent effort to investigate the affine equivalence of RSBFs.
Some recent efforts include [51], [52], [53], [54], and [55]. In this chapter, we focus on a
type of affine equivalence named “S-equivalence” applied to monomial rotation-symmetric
(MRS) functions. The material in this chapter is based on Chung and Stanica [56].
3.2. AFFINE EQUIVALENCE OF BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
Definition 3.2.1. We say that f, g ∈ Bn are affine equivalent if there exists an n × n
invertible matrix A over the finite field F2, the vectors b, c ∈ Fn2 and d ∈ F2 such that
g(x) = f(xA⊕ b)⊕ c · x⊕ d.
Some researchers prefer a simplified version of equivalence where c = 0 and d = 0.
Definition 3.2.2. [55] We say that two Boolean functions f(x) and g(x) in Bn are equiva-
lent under an affine transformation if g(x) = f(xA⊕b), where A is an n×n nonsingular
matrix over the finite field F2 and b is an n-dimensional vector over F2. We say f(xA⊕b)
is a nonsingular affine transformation of f(x).
In this thesis, we focus on a type of affine equivalence where b = 0, c = 0, d = 0,
and A is permutation matrix. We will define this notion called “S-equivalence” in a later
section.
Example 3.2.3. Consider the following five variable Boolean functions,
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f = x1x2 ⊕ x3x4x5
f1 = x1x2 ⊕ x3x4x5 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3
f2 = x1x2 ⊕ x3x4x5 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ 1
f3 = x3x4 ⊕ x1x2x5 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ 1
f4 = (x4 ⊕ 1)x3 ⊕ x1x2(x5 ⊕ 1)⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ 1
= x3x4 ⊕ x1x2x5 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x1 ⊕ 1
We see that f1 = f ⊕ c · x, where c = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0). f2 = f ⊕ c · x ⊕ d, where
c = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1) and d = 1. f3 = f(xA)⊕ c · x⊕ d, where
A =

0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0

,
c = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0), and d = 1. f4 = f(xA⊕ b)⊕ c · x⊕ d, where A, c, and d are same as
f3 with b = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0).
Essentially, a permutation transformation rearranges the order of input, which pre-
serves the Hamming weight of the truth table. Clearly, if f and g are equivalent under
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affine transformation, then wt(f) = wt(g) and nl(f) = nl(g). However, the sufficiency
only holds for quadratic Boolean functions.
Theorem 3.2.4. [56] Two quadratic functions f and g in Bn are equivalent under affine
transformation if and only if wt(f) = wt(g) and nl(f) = nl(g).
Unfortunately, the result cannot be extended to higher degrees. In S-equivalence,
we obtain a similar result for degrees ≥ 2. If two functions f and g in Bn are S-equivalent,
then wt(f) = wt(g) and nl(f) = nl(g). The converse of the statement does not hold. We
can still use the result to show non-equivalence in many cases.
3.3. ROTATION-SYMMETRIC BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
Definition 3.3.1. Let xi ∈ F2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we define the permutation ρkn
on (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn2 such that










ρkn(xi) = xi+k if i+ k ≤ n
and
ρkn(xi) = xi+k−n if i+ k > n.
Hence, ρkn acts as k-cyclic rotation on an n-bit vector.
Based on the permutation in Definition 3.3.1, we define the RSBF.
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Definition 3.3.2. A Boolean function f is called rotation symmetric if, for each vector
(x1, . . . , xn) in Fn2 ,
f(ρkn(x1, . . . , xn)) = f(x1, . . . , xn), for 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Definition 3.3.2 implies that the rotation-symmetric Boolean functions (RSBFs)
are invariant under a cyclic rotation of input vectors. Clearly, the input vectors in a rotation
class are in a equivalence relation. Therefore, the inputs of a rotation-symmetric Boolean
function can be divided into partitions so that each partition consists of all cyclic shifts of
one input. A partition is generated by say Gn(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = {ρkn(x1, x2, . . . , xn)|1 ≤
k ≤ n}, and we denote the number of such partitions gn. By the product rule of combi-
natorics, the number of n-variable RSBFs is 2gn . Let φ(k) be Euler’s phi-function. Then,









Let gn,w denote the number of partitions with w, the common weight of the vectors in par-
tition. The papers [45], [47], and [48] address the formula on how to calculate gn,w for
arbitrary n and w. It is also noteworthy that Zhang and Deng [57] corrected the enumera-
tion of Gn(x1, x2, . . . , xn) such that |Gn(x1, x2, . . . , xn)| = n in [48] and generalized the
enumeration for |Gn(x1, x2, . . . , xn)| = r where r |n.
Definition 3.3.3. Let
Gn(x1, . . . , xn) = {ρkn(x1, . . . , xn), for 1 ≤ k ≤ n},
be the orbit of (x1, . . . , xn) under the action of ρkn, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. It is clear thatGn(x1, . . . , xn)
generates a partition in the set Fn2 . A rotation-symmetric function f(x1, . . . , xn) can be
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written (for short) as
a0 ⊕ a1x1 ⊕
∑
a1jx1xj ⊕ · · · ⊕ a12...nx1x2 . . . xn (SANF ),
where the coefficients a0, a1, a1j, . . . , a12...n ∈ {0, 1}, and the existence of a representative
term x1xi2 . . . xil implies the existence of all the terms from Gn(x1xi2 . . . xil) in the ANF.
We call this representation of f the short algebraic normal form (SANF) of f .
Remark 3.3.4. We note that the SANF is not unique, since one can choose any represen-
tative in Gn(x1xi2 . . . xil).
Example 3.3.5. 5-variable RSBFs f and g are shown in ANF and SANF below.
f(x) = x1(SANF )
= x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x5
g(x) = x1 ⊕ x1x2x5(SANF )
= x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x1x2x5 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x5x1x4
If the SANF of a RSBF contains only one term, we call such a function a monomial
rotation-symmetric (MRS) function. A simple number theoretic deduction gives us that the
ANF of a monomial rotation-symmetric function contains a divisor of n number of terms.
If that divisor is in fact n, we call the function a full-cycle MRS, otherwise, a short-cycle
MRS.
39
Example 3.3.6. 6-variable RSBF f(x) = x1x2(SANF ) is a full-cycle MRS function, and
g(x) = x1x4(SANF ) are short-cycle MRS function, as shown below.
f(x) = x1x2 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ x4x5 ⊕ x5x6 ⊕ x6x1
g(x) = x1x4 ⊕ x2x5 ⊕ x3x6
3.4. CIRCULANT MATRICES
One of the interesting matrices in linear algebra is a Toeplitz matrix. An n × n
Toeplitz matrix A = {aij} has a form
A =

a1 a2 a3 · · · · · · an
an+1 a1 a2
. . . ...
an+2 an+1
. . . . . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . . . . a2 a3
... . . . an+1 a1 a2
a2n−1 · · · · · · an+2 an+1 a1

.
Toeplitz matrices have various engineering applications and have been widely studied. A
circulant matrix is a special type of Toeplitz matrix where a2 = a2n−1, a3 = a2n−2, ... , and
an = an+1. We apply the principles found in the structure of a circulant matrix extensively
in our new findings. To be precise, we use the following definition for a circulant matrix.
Definition 3.4.1. An n × n matrix C is circulant, denoted by C(c1, c2, . . . , cn), if all its




c1 c2 c3 · · · · · · cn
cn c1 c2
. . . ...
cn−1 cn
. . . . . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . . . . c2 c3
... . . . cn c1 c2
c2 · · · · · · cn−1 cn c1

,
where ci ∈ F for F is a field, and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We denote the set of all circulant matrices as C and the set of all n × n circulant
matrices as Cn.
We define the generating polynomial F of a circulant matrix C(c1, . . . , cn) by
F (x) = c1 + c2z + · · ·+ cnzn−1.
It is clear that the circulant matrices are closed under matrix addition. That is, for
any two circulant matricesA andB,A+B is circulant as well. Additionally,A+B = B+A
and the associative property holds. Therefore, Cn forms an abelian group. We proceed to
prove another interesting fact about circulant matrices. We also observe that the transpose
of a circulant matrix C = C(c1, c2, . . . , cn), denoted by CT , is C(c1, cn, cn−1, . . . , c2)
Proposition 3.4.2. [56] An n × n matrix C = {cij} is circulant if and only if cij = cuv
whenever j − i ≡ u− v (mod n).
There exists a way to express a circulant matrix as a linear combination of a basis




0 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
...




... . . . 1 0
0 0
. . . 0 1
1 0 0 · · · 0 0

.
The following lemma shows that the power of G, Gj , where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, form a
basis for the commutative algebra Cn.









where ∆(A) = {i| ai = 1} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
It is well-known that the circulant matrices in C commute in multiplication [58, p.
68]. Since some matrix properties in C may not hold in F2, we verify the commutativity.
Lemma 3.4.4. [56] Let A = C(a1, a2, . . . , an) and B = C(b1, b2, . . . , bn) be two elements



































a1 a2 a3 · · · · · · an
an a1 a2
. . . ...
an−1 an
. . . . . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . . . . a2 a3
... . . . an a1 a2




b1 b2 b3 · · · · · · bn
bn b1 b2
. . . ...
bn−1 bn
. . . . . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . . . . b2 b3
... . . . bn b1 b2

























. . . . . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . . . .
















































Therefore, the claim holds.
Clearly, Cn has the associative property with respect to matrix multiplication. There-
fore, Cn forms a commutative monoid. Since Cn is an abelian group, Cn forms a commu-
tative algebra. We recall A ∈ Cn implies that AT ∈ Cn. Then, we have ATA = AAT by
Theorem 3.4.4. Therefore, Cn is normal.
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C(a1, adn/2e+1, a2, adn/2e+2, . . . , adn/2e) if n is odd.
C(a1 + an/2+1, 0, a2 + an/2+1, 0, . . . , 0) if n is even.
Proof. Let
A = C(a1, a2, . . . , an)
=

a1 a2 a3 · · · · · · an
an a1 a2
. . . ...
an−1 an
. . . . . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . . . . a2 a3
... . . . an a1 a2
a2 · · · · · · an−1 an a1

.
























aiaj = a1a1 ⊕ a2a2k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ak+1ak+2 ⊕ ak+2ak+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2k+1a2




aiaj = a1a2 ⊕ a2a1 ⊕ a3a2k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2k+2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2k+1a3




aiaj = a1a3 ⊕ a2a2 ⊕ a3a1 ⊕ a4a2k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2k+1a4





aiaj = a1a2k+1 ⊕ a2a2k ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2ka2 ⊕ a2k+1a1
a2k+1 ⊕ 2a1a2k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ 2a2ka2 = ak+1.
Therefore,
A2 = C (a1, ak+2, a2, ak+3, a3, . . . , ak, a2k+1, ak+1)
= C(a1, adn/2e+1, a2, adn/2e+2, . . . , adn/2e).
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aiaj = a1a1 ⊕ a2a2k ⊕ · · · ⊕ akak+2 ⊕ ak+1ak+1 ⊕ ak+2ak ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2ka2




aiaj = a1a2 ⊕ a2a1 ⊕ a3a2k ⊕ a4a2k−1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2k−1a4 ⊕ a2ka3




aiaj = a1a3 ⊕ a2a2 ⊕ a3a1 ⊕ a4a2k ⊕ · · · ⊕ ak+2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2ka4





aiaj = a1a2k ⊕ a2a2k ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2ka2 ⊕ a2ka1
2a1a2k ⊕ · · · ⊕ 2a2ka2 = 0.
Therefore,
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A2 = C (a1 + ak+1, 0, a2 ⊕ ak+2, 0, a3 ⊕ ak+3, . . . , aka2k, 0)
= C(a1 ⊕ an/2+1, 0, a2 ⊕ an/2+1, 0, . . . , 0)
An n× n permutation matrix Pσ is an n× n matrix obtained by applying a permu-
tation σ ∈ Sn, where Sn is the symmetric group of the order n to the rows (or columns) of
the identity matrix In.
Definition 3.4.6. We define a relation denoted by∼ on Cn as follows. LetA1 = C(a1, . . . , an),
A2 = C(b1, . . . , bn). Then,
A1 ∼ A2 if and only if (a1, . . . , an) = ρk(b1, . . . , bn).
Due to reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity of the relation, the relation ∼ is an equiv-
alence relation, which partitions C into equivalence classes. We denote the set of the
equivalent classes as C/∼. We further denote the equivalence class of C(a1, a2, . . . , an)
by C〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 or 〈C(a1, a2, . . . , an)〉.
Lemma 3.4.7. [56] Let M1, M2 ∈ Cn, and let M−11 and M−12 exist. Then, M1 and M2
belong to the same equivalence class if and only if M−11 and M
−1
2 also belong to the same
equivalence class.
Proof. We just prove the necessity; the sufficiency proof is similar. LetM1 =C(a1, a2, . . . , an),
M2 = C(b1, b2, . . . , bn) and M−11 = C(α1, α2, . . . , αn) and M
−1
2 = C(β1, β2 . . . , βn). It is
sufficient to show that M−12 ∈ C 〈α1, α2, . . . , αn〉. We know that
(b1, b2, . . . , bn) = ρ
k(a1, a2, . . . , an)
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for some k. Thus,
M2 = PkM1
for some permutation matrix Pk = C(ρk(1, 0, . . . , 0)). Therefore, by taking the inverse of







Therefore, M−11 and M
−1
2 belong to the same equivalence class.
To conclude this section, we show that the equivalence classes of Definition 3.4.6
form a commutative monoid which contains a abelian group.
Theorem 3.4.8. [56] The set (C/∼ , ·) with the operation 〈A〉 · 〈B〉 := 〈AB〉 is a commuta-
tive monoid. Moreover, the previous operation partitions the invertible circulant matrices
C into equivalent classes, say C∗/∼, and consequently, (C∗/∼ , ·) becomes a group.
Proof. First, we show that the operation is well defined. Let A = C(a1, . . . , an) ∼ A′ =
C(a′1, . . . , a
′
n), B = C(b1, . . . , bn) ∼ B′ = C(b′1, . . . , b′n). We need to show that AB ∼




































Let k and s be such that
ρk(a1, . . . , an) = (a1+k (mod n), . . . , an+k (mod n))




ρs(b1, . . . , bn) = (b1+s (mod n), . . . , bn+s (mod n))















































It is immediate that the defined operation is associative, and the identity element is
C〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉=〈In〉, the class of the identity matrix. The commutative property follows
from Lemma 3.4.4. By Lemma 3.4.7, we can let 〈M〉−1 be the equivalence class of all
inverses of circulant matrices from 〈M〉. We have
〈M〉 · 〈M〉−1 = 〈M〉 · 〈M−1〉
= 〈In〉,
and the lemma is proved.
3.5. S-EQUIVALENCE OF MRS BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
Definition 3.5.1. Let f, g ∈ Bnbe MRS functions. f and g are S-equivalent, denoted by
f
s∼ g if there exists a permutation matrix P such that
g(x) = f(xP ).
Example 3.5.2. [56] Let n = 7, and the quartic MRS functions
f(x) = x1x2x3x4 ⊕ x2x3x4x5 ⊕ x3x4x5x6 ⊕ x4x5x6x7
⊕x5x6x7x1 ⊕ x6x7x1x2 ⊕ x7x1x2x3,
g(x) = x1x2x4x6 ⊕ x2x3x5x7 ⊕ x3x4x6x1 ⊕ x4x5x7x2
⊕x5x6x1x3 ⊕ x6x7x2x4 ⊕ x7x1x3x5
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Using the permutation pi = (2, 3, 5)(4, 7, 6) expressed in product of disjoint cycles, we
check that f ◦ pi = g.
We associate f to the following circulant matrix equivalence class
Af = C
〈 1↓
1, 0, . . . ,
j2
↓
1 , 0, . . . , 0,
j3
↓
1 , . . . , 0,
jd
↓







1, 0, . . . ,
j2
↓
1 , 0, . . . , 0,
j3
↓
1 , . . . , 0,
jd
↓




where the 1’s appear in positions prompted by the indices of any monomial of ANF of f .
We can illustrate ∆(f) = ∆(any representative of Af ). In general, for Af as in Equation
(3.1), then ∆(f) = [1, j2, . . . , jd] = [2, j2 + 1, . . . , jd + 1] = · · · . Also, the length of ∆(A)
is denoted by wt(∆(A)), which is the weight of any row of Af .





1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1

〉
∆(f) = [1, 2, 4] = [2, 3, 5] = [1, 3, 4] = [2, 4, 5] = [1, 3, 5].
Lemma 3.5.4. [56] Let f be an MRS Boolean function, and Fi, i = 1, 2, be the gener-
ating polynomials for the circulant matrices M1 = C(a1, a2, . . . , an), respectively, M2 =
C(b1, . . . , bn) inAf , where (b1, . . . , bn) = ρk(a1, . . . , an), for some k. Then, gcd(F1(z), zn−
1) = gcd(F2(z), z
n − 1).
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Proof. Since (b1, b2, . . . , bn) = ρk(a1, a2, . . . , an), for some k, we use an inductive argu-
ment to prove the lemma. Let k = 1. Then, (b1, b2, . . . , bn) = (an, a0, . . . , an−2). Now, we
need to show that
gcd(F1(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(F2(z), zn − 1)
for
F1(z) = a1 + a2z + · · ·+ anzn−1
and
F2(z) = an + a1z + · · ·+ an−1zn−1.
Certainly,
zF1(z)− F2(z) = an(zn − 1). (3.2)
Since multiplying z by F1(z) does not change gcd(F1(z), zn − 1),
gcd(F1(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(zF1(z), zn − 1).
By Equation 3.2
gcd(F1(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(an(zn − 1) + F2(z), zn − 1).
By the Euclidean algorithm,
gcd(F1(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(F2(z), zn − 1).
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For the inductive step, assume it is true for k = s. Then, we try to show for k = s+ 1. Let,
(b1, b2, . . . , bn) = (an−s, an−s+1, . . . , an−s−1). We need to show that
gcd(F1(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(Fs+1(z), zn − 1)
for
F1(z) = a1 + a2z + · · ·+ anzn−1
and
Fs+1(z) = an−s + an−s+1z + · · ·+ an−s−1zn−1.
Let
Fs(z) = an−s+1 + an−s+2z + · · ·+ an−szn−1.
Then,
zFs(z)− Fs+1(z) = an−s(zn − 1). (3.3)
Since multiplying z by Fs(z) does not change gcd(Fs(z), zn − 1),
gcd(Fs(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(zFs(z), zn − 1).
By Equation 3.3
gcd(Fs(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(an−s(zn − 1) + Fs+1(z), zn − 1).
By the Euclidean algorithm,
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gcd(Fs(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(Fs+1(z), zn − 1).
By the induction hypothesis, we conclude that
gcd(F1(z), z
n − 1) = gcd(Fs+1(z), zn − 1),
which proves the lemma.
We introduce the concept of a generalized inverse.
Definition 3.5.5. For a square matrix A, we call a matrix A∗ of the same dimension a
generalized inverse if
AA∗A = A.




In addition, if both AA† and A†A are symmetric, then A† is called a (Moore–Penrose)
pseudoinverse of A. [59].
It is known that matrices over finite fields have at least one generalized inverse [60].
Also, if a pseudoinverse exists, it is unique [60]. However, it is not known if any of these
generalized inverses of circulant matrices are circulant. Our next result deals with that
problem, and, in the process, the first part generalizes the second, which was shown in [61,
Theorem 2.2].
55
Theorem 3.5.6. [56] LetA = C(a1, . . . , an) be a circulant matrix over F2 of the generating
polynomial F = a1 + a2z + · · · + an−1zn ∈ F2[z]. Let gcd(F (z), zn − 1) = D(z),
zn − 1 = H(z) · D(z), and assume that gcd(D(z), H(z)) = 1. Then, the following
statements hold:




with F (z) ·F ∗(z) ≡ 1 (mod H(z)). Moreover, the circulant matrix A has a circulant gen-
eralized inverse, precisely, A · A∗ · A = A, where A∗ = C(α1, . . . , αn). Additionally, if
gcd(F, zn − 1) = gcd(F ∗, zn − 1), then A∗ is in fact the reflexive generalized inverse A†.
(ii) [61, Theorem 2.2] If gcd(F, zn− 1) = 1, then the matrix A is invertible and its
inverse is A−1 = C(α1, . . . , αn), where (α1, α2, . . . , αn) is the unique solution of
(α1, α2, . . . , αn) · A = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Moreover, if F ∗(z) = α1 + α2z + · · ·+ αnzn−1, then F (z) · F ∗(z) ≡ 1 mod (zn − 1).
Proof. The claim (ii) follows from (i). To show (i), let n = 2tm with m odd, and t
an arbitrary integer. By [62, p.63 Theorem 2.42 (ii)], every irreducible factor of zn − 1
over F2 appears at the power 2t. Let Φ(z) be an arbitrary irreducible factor of H(z) =
(zn − 1)/D(z). Since gcd(D(z), H(z)) = 1, gcd(F (z),Φ(z)) = 1. Therefore, the class
of F (z) is invertible in the ring F2[z]/
〈
Φ2
t〉. This implies that there exists FΦ(z)∗ with






the Chinese remainder theorem, we obtain that there exists F ∗ with F (z) · F ∗(z) ≡ 1
(mod H(z)). Moreover, F ∗(z) is unique modulo H(z).




j−1, and we will show that AA∗A = A, where A∗ = C(α1, . . . , αn).




. Since D divides F and H divides FF ∗ − 1,
then zn − 1 = HD divides F (FF ∗ − 1) and so, we have the identity F 2F ∗ = F in
F2[z]/
〈






























 = C(a1, a2, . . . , an).
That is AA∗A = A.
Using gcd(F (z), zn − 1) = gcd(F ∗(z), zn − 1), by a similar argument as before,
we get that A is also a generalized inverse for A∗, that is, A∗AA∗ = A∗, which shows the
last claim of (i).
As for the pseudoinverse, we observe that the transpose of a circulant matrix A =
C(a1, a2, . . . , an) is At = C(a1, an, . . . , a2). Let i′ = (n + 2 − i) mod n, and k′ =




































which does not necessarily imply that AA∗ = (AA∗)t.
Remark 3.5.7. [56] It may be tempting to conjecture that every circulant matrix has a
generalized inverse that is circulant. However, during a computer exercise, we noticed that
the circulant matrix C(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) does not have a circulant generalized inverse. We
observe that C(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) corresponds to F (z) = 1 + z3 with n = 6. Since z6 − 1 =
F (z)2,
H(z) = D(z) = F (z).
So, we have
gcd(D,H) 6= 1.
Therefore, Theorem 3.5.6 does not apply, and F has no inverse modulo F .
We mention another way to detect singularity or nonsingularity of the associated
circulant matrix to an MRS. In [46], Stanica et al. found a characterization of Boolean
functions whose associated circulant matrices are singular.
Proposition 3.5.8. [46] Let f be a degree d MRS with associated Af = C
〈
a1, . . . , an
〉
(assume that a1 = 1). Let ∆(Af ) = [1, s2, . . . , sd]. Then, Af is singular if and only if there
is an n-th root of unity µ such that 1 + µs2 + · · ·+ µsd = 0 (over Z2).
Corollary 3.5.9. [46] With the notation of the previous proposition, we have
58
(i) If wt(∆(Af )) is even, then Af is singular.
(ii) Let p be the least odd prime occurring in the factorization of n. Assume that
∆(Af ) = [1, s2, . . . , sd] has odd weight d and sd ≤ p− 2. Then Af is nonsingular.
We define the dual function with respect to a degree d MRS function f with invert-
ible Af . We consider the ordered set ∆(A−1f ) = [j1, j2, . . . , jt] and define the MRS dual
function f ∗ by
f ∗ = xj1xj2 · · · xjt(SANF ).
Our next result gives an extension for the necessity part of Theorem 3.2.4.
Theorem 3.5.10. [56] Let f and g be two MRS Boolean functions in n-variables. If Af
and Ag are invertible and f
s∼ g (f and g are affine equivalent by a permutation in Sn),
then wt(∆(f)) = wt(∆(g)) and wt(∆(f ∗)) = wt(∆(g∗)).
Proof. Since f s∼ g, then there exists a permutation τ ∈ Sn with Af◦τ = Ag. Clearly,
f and g have the same degrees. Therefore, wt(∆(f)) = wt(∆(g)). Let the SANF of f
be x1xj2 · · ·xjdwith I = {1, j2, . . . , jd}. We set Af = 〈C(a1, . . . , an)〉 such that ai = 1
if i ∈ I , and 0 otherwise. Using the same steps, we also let A−1f = 〈C(α1, . . . , αn)〉,
Ag = 〈C(b1, . . . , bn)〉 , and A−1g = 〈C(β1, . . . , βn)〉. Then we have
〈C(b1, . . . , bn)〉 =
〈
C(api(1), api(2), . . . , api(n))
〉
,
since Ag = Af◦τ , where pi = τ−1. We introduce the notations ri(A) and ci(A) for the i-th
row and the j-th column of a matrix A, respectively. Since the permutation τ preserves
the rotation symmetry, there exists a permutation matrix such that every row of PAg (not
a circulant matrix any longer) is the permutation of the same indexed row of Af . Then we
have
ri(PAg) = pi(ri(Af )).
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By the hypothesis, there exists the inverse matrix
U = A−1f = 〈C(α1, . . . , αn)〉 .
Therefore, we have
ri(Af )U = ri(In)
and
ri(U)Af = ri(In).
Then, we can set
ri(Af ) = (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,n)
= (an−i+2, . . . , an−i+1),
which is the i-th shift of the first row of Af . Let δi,j be the Kronecker delta function, that
is, δi,j = 1 if i = j, and δi,j = 0 otherwise. Since pi is a permutation, we can interpret the
equation AfU = In in the following way:




upi(1),1 · · · upi(n),n
upi(1),1 · · · upi(n),n
· · · · · · · · ·






















= (β1, . . . , βn).
Recall that multiplication by a permutation matrix to the right has the effect of rearranging
the columns, and to the left has the effect of re-arranging the rows. Since U−1 is also
circulant, hence every row has the same weight, we obtain





















= wt(α1, . . . , αn).
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Example 3.5.11. [56] Take n = 5, and f s∼ g whose SANFs are x1x2x4, respectively,
x1x2x3 (and so, wt(∆(f)) = wt(∆(g))). Certainly,
Af = C
〈
1, 1, 0, 1, 0
〉
, Ag = C
〈




0, 1, 1, 1, 0
〉
, A−1g = C
〈
0, 1, 1, 0, 1
〉
,
and so, wt(∆(f ∗)) = wt(∆(g∗)) (in fact, in this case the dual of f is f ∗ = g). As an-
other example, we take n = 8, f, g with SANFs x1x2x4, respectively, x1x4x5 (and so,
wt(∆(f)) = wt(∆(g))). We compute
Af = C
〈
1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0
〉
, Ag = C
〈




1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1
〉
, A−1g = C
〈
0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0
〉
,
and so, wt(∆(f ∗)) = 5 6= wt(∆(g∗)) = 3, therefore f 6 s∼ g.
Remark 3.5.12. The conditions wt(∆(f)) = wt(∆(g)), wt(∆(f ∗)) = wt(∆(g∗)) are not
sufficient to ensure that the functions f, g are S-equivalent. As an example, take n = 8
and f, g with ∆(f) = [1, 2, 3],∆(g) = [1, 2, 4]. The two functions are not in the same
S-equivalence class, yet wt(∆(f)) = wt(∆(g)) = 3 and wt(∆(f ∗)) = wt(∆(g∗)) = 5, as
one can check easily.
For a degree d MRS, whose class Af is not invertible, let the equivalence class of
the circulant pseudoinverse matrix denoted by A†f with ∆(A
†
f ) = [j1, j2, . . . , jt]. Then the
pseudo-dual Boolean function is
f † = xj1xj2 · · ·xjt ⊕ xj1+1xj2+1 · · · xjt+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xj1−1xj2−1 · · ·xjt−1.
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We propose the following question, which seems to be true, based on computer data.
Open Problem. [56] If f s∼ g with singular matrices Af and Ag, respectively
with circulant pseudoinverses, is it true that wt(∆(f)) = wt(∆(g)) implies wt(∆(f †)) =
wt(∆(g†))?
We now present some results obtained while pursuing the open problem.
Theorem 3.5.13. [56] Let f and g be two n-variables MRS with f s∼ g, and Af =
C
〈
a1, . . . , an
〉
, Ag = C
〈
api(1), . . . , api(n)
〉
for some permutation pi. The matrices have
pseudoinverses C
〈




β1, . . . , βn
〉
, respectively. Let τ be the permutation
τ(1) = 1, τ(2) = dn/2e + 1, τ(3) = 2, τ(4) = dn/2e + 2, . . .. The following statements
are true:
(i) Let n be odd. Then
(a1, . . . , an) =
(
aτ(1), . . . , aτ(n)
)
C(α1, . . . , αn)
(α1, . . . , αn) =
(
ατ(1), . . . , ατ(n)
)
C(a1, . . . , an)
(




a(pi◦τ)(1), . . . , a(pi◦τ)(n)
)
C(β1, . . . , βn)
(β1, . . . , βn) =
(








(ii) Let n be even. Then
(a1, . . . , an) =
(
aτ(1) ⊕ aτ(2), 0, aτ(3) ⊕ aτ(4), 0, . . .
)
C(α1, . . . , αn)
(α1, . . . , αn) =
(
ατ(1) ⊕ ατ(2), 0, ατ(3) ⊕ ατ(4), 0, . . .
)
C(a1, . . . , an)
(




a(pi◦τ)(1) ⊕ a(pi◦τ)(2), 0, . . .
)
C(β1, . . . , βn)
(β1, . . . , βn) =
(




api(1), . . . , api(n)
)
.
Proof. (i) Let n be odd. For the first part, by the definition of pseudoinverse,
(a1, . . . , an) = (1, 0, . . . , 0)C(a1, . . . , an)
= (1, 0, . . . , 0)C(a1, . . . , an)C(α1, . . . , αn)C(a1, . . . , an)
= (1, 0, . . . , 0)C(a1, . . . , an)
2C(α1, . . . , αn).
Let Pτ be the permutation matrix for τ . By Corollary 3.4.5,
C(a1, . . . , an)
2 = C(a1, adn/2e+1, a2, adn/2e+2, . . . , adn/2e)
= C((a1, . . . , an)Pτ )
= C(aτ(1), . . . , aτ(n)).
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Therefore,
(a1, . . . , an) = ((1, 0, . . . , 0)C(a1, . . . , an)
2C(α1, . . . , αn)
= (1, 0, . . . , 0)C(aτ(1), . . . , aτ(n))C(α1, . . . , αn)
= (aτ(1), . . . , aτ(n))C(α1, . . . , αn).
The second part is immediate since C(α1, . . . , αn) is a pseudoinverse of C(a1, . . . ,
an), which shows that it is also reflexive inverse.
For the third part, let Ppi be the permutation matrix for pi. Then, using Corollary
3.4.5,
(
api(1), . . . , api(n)
)
= (1, 0, . . . , 0)C
(
api(1), . . . , api(n)
)
= (1, 0, . . . , 0)C
(
api(1), . . . , api(n)
)2
C(β1, . . . , βn)
(
a(pi◦τ)(1), . . . , a(pi◦τ)(n)
)
C(β1, . . . , βn).
The fourth part is immediate, since C(β1, . . . , βn) is a reflexive inverse of C(api(1),
. . . , api(n)).
(ii) We can show this using similar techniques used in (i) with Corollary 3.4.5.
For an MRS function f , when Af does not have a pseudoinverse, but circulant
generalized inverses, the notion of dual is not well defined. Often, the weights of the
generalized inverses differ and the generalized inverses are not unique. However, they
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do correspond to a unique generalized inverse, which is the smallest in lexicographical
order, via the congruence modulo the corresponding H’s in Theorem 3.5.6. This unique-
ness is not readily recognizable in matrix form. Let us define the dual Boolean function
corresponding to that unique representative of all generalized inverses. Using this notion,
for singular Af and Ag without a pseudoinverse, but with circulant generalized inverses,
the condition wt(∆(f ∗)) = wt(∆(g∗)) does not hold. To illustrate this, let n = 7. We
check that f = x1x2x3x5(SANF ) and g = x1x2x3x6(SANF ) are S-equivalent. The
functions do not have pseudoinverses, but circulant general inverses. We computed all gen-
eralized inverses that are circulant, and they are in the classes A∗f = C
〈
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
〉
and A∗g = C
〈
1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
〉
, respectively. Clearly, we have
wt(∆(f ∗)) 6= wt(∆(g∗)).
We now consider the case of a converse of our previous theorem. For simplicity, we
assume all indices are mod n. Let P and Q be permutation matrices. Then, it is known
that if two circulant matrices A and B are P -Q equivalent, that is, PA = BQ, then AAT
and BBT are similar matrices [63]. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that AAT =∑
i,j∈∆(A) G
ai−aj , where A = C(a1, . . . , an). This actually points to the importance of
the differences ai − aj , which played a role in Cusick’s paper [55], which only addresses
the MRS functions with wt(∆(f)) = 3. Given a permutation δ, we let Pδ be the row
permutation matrix corresponding to the permutation δ.
Theorem 3.5.14. [56] Let f and g be MRS functions with Af = C(a1, . . . , an), Ag =
C(b1, . . . , bn), respectively. Let a permutation matrices Pσ for the permutation σ and a
permutation matrix Qτ for the permutation τ such that PσAf = AgQτ . Then, wt(∆(f)) =
wt(∆(g)) and aσ(j)+i−1 = bτ(i)+j−1.
If Af and Bg are invertible, then we also have
(α1, . . . , αn) =
(





wt(∆(f ∗)) = wt(∆(g∗))
where (α1, . . . , αn) = A−1f and (β1, . . . , βn) = A
−1
g .
Proof. Let Af = C(a1, . . . , an) and Ag = C(b1, . . . , bn). We write
PσAf =

aσ(1) aσ(1)+1 · · · aσ(1)+n−1
aσ(2) aσ(2)+1 · · · aσ(2)+n−1
· · · · · · · · · ·




bτ(1) bτ(2) · · · bτ(n)
bτ(1)+1 bτ(2)+1 · · · bτ(n)+1
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
bτ(1)+n−1 bτ(2)+n−1 · · · bτ(n)+n−1
 .
From PσAf = AgQτ , we derive
aσ(j)+i−1 = bτ(i)+j−1.
We note that the first rows of PσAf andAgQτ are the same. Also, the sets {σ(1), σ(1)+
1, . . . , σ(1) + n− 1} and {τ(1), τ(2), . . . , τ(n)} are simply permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Therefore, we see that
wt
(
aσ(1), aσ(1)+1, . . . , aσ(1)+n−1
)
= wt(a1, a2, . . . , an),
wt
(
bτ(1), bτ(2), . . . , bτ(n)
)




From Theorem 3.5.6, αi and βi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n are unique with the property
(1, 0, . . . , 0) = (α1, . . . , αn)C(a1, . . . , an) (3.5)
(1, 0, . . . , 0) = (β1, . . . , βn)C(b1, . . . , bn).
We multiply the second relation by Qτ from the right and obtain
(0, . . . , 0,
τ(1)
↓
1 , 0, . . .) = (β1, . . . , βn)AgQτ
= (β1, . . . , βn)PσAf
=
(




We multiply the last equation from the right by the permutation matrix Rρn+1−τ(1) , corre-
sponding to the shift ρn+1−τ(1), to rewrite the left hand side of (3.6) in the standard form
(1, 0, . . . , 0). Since Rρn+1−τ(1) is also a circulant matrix, by Lemma 3.4.4, it will commute
with Af and (3.6) becomes
(1, 0, . . . , 0) =
(





βσ−1(1)−τ(1)+1, . . . , βσ−1(n)−τ(1)+1
)
Af .
Since (α1, . . . , αn) was unique with the property (3.5),
(α1, . . . , αn) =
(
βσ−1(1)−τ(1)+1, . . . , βσ−1(n)−τ(1)+1
)
68
where the indices are mod n. Since the indices above right are just a permutation of
{1, 2, . . . , n}, we immediately get wt(∆(f ∗)) = wt(∆(g∗)).
The previous theorem easily extends to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5.15. [56] Let f and g be two full–cycle MRS functions with the invertible
classes Af and Ag, respectively. Let A−1f = C
〈
α1, . . . , αn
〉
and A−1g = C
〈




s∼ g, then there exists a permutation matrix P such that
P · (α1, . . . , αn)T = (β1, . . . , βn)T .
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4. MRS BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS AND GRAPHS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The difficulty in the affine equivalence problem may be mitigated by establishing
relationships to other disciplines in mathematics for possible solutions. Graph theory stud-
ies the properties of a graph, which is a structure defined by a set of vertices (or nodes)
and a set of edges which connect vertices to each other. Often, a graph representation of
an algebraic structure helps us to visualize the complexity of the structure. One simple
example is visualization of a Boolean function using a tree, which is a graph in which each
pair of vertices is connected by a unique path. There have been many attempts to establish
meaningful relationships between graphs and Boolean functions. One of the interesting
connections involves bent functions and Cayley graphs. In [64], Bernasconi and Conde-
notti showed that the Walsh transforms of some Boolean functions can be analyzed by a
Cayley graph representation of Boolean functions. They later extended their finding to the
characterization of bent functions, using strongly regular graphs in [65]. In 2007, Stan-
ica [66] presented necessary conditions for bent functions and investigated the propagation
criteria of Boolean functions, using the Cayley graph representation. In this chapter, we
present some basic graph-theory material, briefly review the Cayley graph representation,
and present a new graph representation of MRS functions and some analysis in regard to
S-equivalence.
4.2. EXAMPLE OF GRAPH REPRESENTATION OF BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
4.2.1. Definitions and Fundamentals of a Graph
A graph G = (V, E) is defined by a set of vertices, V or V (G) and a set of edges,
E or E(G) = {{x, y} |x, y ∈ V, andx 6= y}. If {x, y} ∈ E(G), we say that x and
y are adjacent. The number of edges that are incident with the vertex v is the degree of
v, denoted by deg(v). Two vertices are connected if we can go from one vertex to the
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other by traveling a path defined by the edges of the graph. A graph is connected if for
every pair of vertices, there exists a path of edges connecting them. If a graph is not
connected, it is disconnected. If each vertex of a graph G has the same degree, we call
G a regular graph. A regular graph G is strongly regular if there exist two integers m
and n such that every two adjacent vertices have m common neighbors, and every two
nonadjacent vertices have n common neighbors. A graph G is bipartite if V (G) can be
partitioned into two sets V1 and V2 such that there exists no edge {v, w} with v, w ∈ V1
or v, w ∈ V2. A graph G is complete if E(G) contains all possible edges. We denote the
complete graph on n vertices byKn. Another special graph we use in this chapter is a cycle.
In this thesis, we denote a cycle as [v1, v2, . . . , vn] where {v1, v2, . . . vn} ⊆ V (G) and E =
{{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, . . . {vn−1, vn}, {vn, v1}}. Clearly, a cycle is a connected regular graph
(or subgraph) of degree 2. Next, we give a formal definition of equality and isomorphism
in graphs.
Definition 4.2.1. Two graphs G(VG, Eg) and H(VH , EH) are equal if
VG = VH andEG = EH .
The graphs G and H are isomorphic if there exists a bijection
f : VG → VH ,
such that for any vertices u, v ∈ VG, {u, v} ∈ EG if and only if {f(u), f(v)} ∈ EH .
Example 4.2.2. Let G1 be the graph with V (G1) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and
E(G1) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {4, 5}}. Sub-figure (a) of Figure 4.1 repre-
sents a drawing of G1. The graph G1 is not regular, since deg(1) = 2 and deg(2) = 3.
The graphs G1 and G2 are isomorphic by the permutation (1, 5)(2, 4). The graph G3 is K5
and clearly strongly regular. The graph G4 on the sub-figure (d) is the cycle [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
However, it is not strongly regular, since the vertices 1 and 3 have one common neigh-
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bor 2, but vertices 1 and 4 have no common neighbor. It is bipartite, with the partition
V1 = {1, 3, 5} and V2 = {2, 4, 6}.
(a) G1 (b) G2
(c) G3 (d) G4
Figure 4.1: Simple Graphs
4.2.2. An Example of Application of Graph Theory to Cryptographic Boolean
Function
There have been many attempts to establish relationships between graph theory and
Boolean functions. One of the most interesting relationships involves affine equivalence of
Boolean functions and Cayley graphs.
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Definition 4.2.3. [4, p. 194] Let f be a Boolean function of n variables. The Cayley graph
of f , denoted by Γf = (V,E), is defined by V = Fn2 and
E = {{v, w} | v, w ∈ Fn2 , v 6= w, and f(v ⊕ w) = 1}.
In [64], Bernasconi and Codenotti introduced the relationship between the Cayley
graph representation of Boolean functions and affine equivalent classes of four variable
Boolean functions. They established an isomorphism between the eight affine equivalent
classes of the 4-variable Boolean functions and eight classes of regular graphs with 16
vertices. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 illustrate their findings. They observed that, as the
nonlinearity increases in the affine equivalent classes, the degree and connectivity of the
matching graphs increase as well. Notably, Class V and VI graphs are degree 4-regular
graphs, but Class VI graph is connected, whereas Class V is disconnected. A supplemental
analysis of the relationship and other related materials can be found in [4, pp. 205–208].
4.3. A GRAPH REPRESENTATION OF ROTATION-SYMMETRIC BOOLEAN
FUNCTIONS
We recall that an MRS function has a cyclical structure in its algebraic normal form
(ANF). Adopting this feature, we attempt to represent a Boolean function with a graph
with a similar property. We observe that an MRS function is a homogeneous function
where each multiplication term of variables can be represented as a cycle. For example,
the MRS Boolean function f(x) = x1x2x3 ⊕ x2x3x4 ⊕ x3x4x5 ⊕ x4x5x6 ⊕ x5x6x1 ⊕
x6x1x2 of six variables can generate six cycles on vertices 1 through 6, that is [1, 2, 3],
[2, 3, 4], [3, 4, 5], [4, 5, 6],[5, 6, 1], and [6, 1, 2]. We can combine them, disregarding multiple
edges, and obtain the graph represented in Figure 4.3. We note that the graph is regular but
not strongly regular, since non-neighboring vertices 1 and 3 have the common neighbors
vertices 2 and 5, but 1 and 4 have the common neighbors 2, 3, 5, and 6.
However, this construction may present a problem with the ordering of variables.












I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
II 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1
III 2 0 -2 0 -2 0 2 0 -2 0 2 0 2 0 -2 0
IV 3 -1 -1 -1 -3 1 1 1 -3 1 1 1 3 -1 -1 -1
V 4 0 0 0 -4 0 0 0 -4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
VI 4 -2 -2 0 -2 0 0 2 -4 2 2 0 2 0 0 -2
VII 5 -3 -3 1 -3 1 1 1 -3 1 1 1 1 1 1 -3
VIII 6 -2 -2 2 -2 -2 2 -2 -2 2 -2 -2 -2 2 2 2
Table 4.1: Affine Equivalence Classes of 4-Variable Boolean Functions From [64]
Example 4.3.1. Let f = x1x2x3x4(SANF ) ∈ F62. Algebraically, x1x2x3x4 = x1x3x2x4.
However, they generate two different cycles and hence two different graph representations
as shown in Figure 4.4.
This indicates that the cyclic representation of MRS is sensitive to the order of
variables. In order to obtain a consistent graph not affected by this ordering problem, we
introduce the following notion, adding an order property to the definition of SANF.
Definition 4.3.2. Let f be an MRS function of n variables with the SANF xj1xj2 · · · xjd ,
where 1 ≤ d ≤ n. The ordered short algebraic normal form (OSANF) of f , denoted by
f = x1xi2 · · ·xid(OSANF ) or f = ‖x1xi2 · · ·xid‖ is the SANF xi1xi2 · · ·xid such that
i1 = 1 and 1 = i1 < i2 < · · · < id.
By Definition 4.3.2, our scheme generates one and only one graph for each MRS
Boolean function.
75







Figure 4.2: Cayley Graph Classes of 4-Variable Boolean Function From [64]
Definition 4.3.3. A cycle combination graph (CCG) of an n-variable MRS Boolean func-
tion f(x) = x1xP2xP3 . . . xPd(OSANF ) with d ≤ n, denoted byGf is a simple graph with
V = {1, 2, . . . n} and the edges of the cycles,
[1, P2, P3, . . . , Pd]
[2, P2 + 1 mod n, P3 + 1 mod n, . . . , Pd + 1 mod n], and
[n, P2 + n− 1 mod n, P3 + n− 1 mod n, . . . , Pd + n− 1 mod n, ],
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(a) Cycle 1 (b) Cycles 1 and 2
(c) Cycles 1 - 3 (d) Cycles 1 - 4
(e) Cycles 1 - 5 (f) Cycles 1 - 6
Figure 4.3: A Cycle Combination of an MRS Boolean Function
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(a) x1x2x3x4(SANF ) (b) x1x3x2x4(SANF )
Figure 4.4: Two Graphs Generated by the Same SANF
regarding multiple edges as one edge.
Remark 4.3.4. In order to make our algebraic operations for the indices work, we add an
additional property to the modular arithmetic in this chapter.
We set
n mod n = 0.
This gives us x0 = xn, and we use the notations interchangeably.
We observe that two Boolean functions in Bn form a relationship with respect to
the CCG. The relationship satisfies reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. Therefore, it is
an equivalence relation and partitions the Boolean functions of n variable into equivalence
classes.
Definition 4.3.5. Two MRS functions of same variables f and h are cycle combination
graph (CCG) equivalent, denoted by f C∼ h if Gf is isomorphic to Gh.
MRS functions add interesting characteristics to the structure of CCGs. These char-
acteristics originate from the cycles generated by shifting variables. Table 4.2 illustrates
how shifting along the indices of the variables effect the cycles.
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Rotation Vertex Index Shift
P1 = 1 P2 P3 · · · · · · Pd
2 P2 + 1 mod n P3 + 1 mod n · · · · · · Pd + 1 mod n





m P2 +m− 1 mod n P3 +m− 1 mod n Pd +m− 1 mod n
...
...
... · · · · · · ...
n− 1 P2 + n− 2 mod n P3 + n− 2 mod n · · · · · · Pd + n− 2 mod n
n P2 + n− 1 mod n P3 + n− 1 mod n · · · · · · Pd + n− 1 mod n
Table 4.2: Vertex Structure of a Cycle Combination Graph of a MRS Function
In order to analyze what happens at each vertex, we measure the distance from
each variable in the monomial term to xn. Let ki be the distance from xPi to xn defined by
ki = n− Pi. Therefore, we have
k1 = n− 1,
k2 = n− P2,
...
...
kd = n− Pd.
Additionally, since we are working with the cycles derived from the variables of a Boolean
function in ANF, we can measure the distance between the vertices in the following manner.
Let ri be the distance between xPi+1 and xPi defined by ri = Pi+1 − Pi. Then, we have
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r1 = P2 − P1,
r2 = P3 − P2, (4.1)
...
...
rd = Pd+1 − Pd,
where Pd+1 = n+ 1.
We focus on vertex 1. Vertex 1 connects 2d times, as shown in Table 4.3.
Shift Vertex 1 and its Neighbors by Shift
0 Pd P1 = 1 P2
1 P1 + k2 + 1 mod n P2 + k2 + 1 mod n = 1 P3 + k2 + 1 mod n





d-1 Pd−1 + kd + 1 mod n Pd + kd + 1 mod n = 1 P1 + kd + 1 mod n
Table 4.3: Vertex 1 and its Neighbors
By applying the descriptions of ki and ri with 1 ≤ i ≤ d, we see that a set of edges
on vertex P1 = 1, as justified below:
{1, 1± r1 (mod n)}
{1, 1± r2 (mod n)} (4.2)
...
...
{1, 1± rd (mod n)}.
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By the shifting action of the CCG generation, the set of edges replicates on each
vertex, depending only on ri’s. Therefore, by an inductive argument, we can generalize the
result for any vertex. Table 4.4 shows the neighbors of an arbitrary vertex m.
Shift Neighbors of Vertex m
0 Pd +m− 1 mod n m P2 +m− 1 mod n
1 P1 + k2 +m mod n P2 + k2 +m mod n = m P3 + k2 +m mod n





d-1 Pd−1 + kd +m mod n Pd + kd +m mod n = m P1 + kd +m mod n
Table 4.4: 2d Neighbors of Arbitrary Vertex m
Applying the same argument as for the vertex 1, we obtain the following neighbors
{m, m± r1 (mod n)},
{m, m± r2 (mod n)}, (4.3)
...
...
{m, m± rd (mod n)}.
This generalization suggests that the CCGs are regular, since a CCG is a simple graph.
Theorem 4.3.6. Let f be an MRS function of n variables generated by x1xp2 . . . xpd(OSANF )
and Gf be the CCG of f . Then Gf is regular.
In particular, Gf is
∣∣∣∣{{1, 1± ri (mod n)} | 1 ≤ i ≤ d}∣∣∣∣-regular,
where ri are defined as in Equation 4.1.
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Proof. By Equation 4.3, vertex 1 has 2d many edges, counting multiple edges, and the
cardinality of
{{1, 1± ri (mod n)} | 1 ≤ i ≤ d}
gives us the number of edges at each vertex, counting multiple edges as one. Also, the
degree of a vertex does not depend on the vertex, as discussed. Therefore, the claim holds.
Generally, each distinct ri adds two edges to a vertex, except when the two edges
coincide with each other. We see that the exception results in an r-regular graph, where r
is an odd number.
Corollary 4.3.7. Let f = x1xp2 . . . xpd(OSANF ) be a MRS function of n variables. Then,
Gf is t-regular graph where t = 2k1 − 1 for some k1 ∈ N if and only if n = 2k2 for some
integer k2 ∈ N , and there exists i with 1 ≤ i ≤d such that ri = k2.
Proof. (⇐) In line with Theorem 4.3.6, for an arbitrary vertex m, we have two edges
{m,m+ k2 mod n} and {m,m− k2 mod n}. Since n = 2k2,
m+ k2 mod n = m− k2 mod n.
Hence, ri = k2 adds one edge to Gf . Additionally, any ri 6= k2 adds two edges to
Gf . Therefore, Gf is t-regular graph where t = 2k1 − 1 for some k1 ∈ N.
(⇒) First, we claim n is even. If n is odd, Theorem 4.3.6 implies that each ri adds
two distinct edges to a vertex. This contradicts that t is odd. In addition, if ri 6= k2 for all
i, then we see that ri’s add two edges to the vertex, which makes t even, a contradiction.
Therefore, the claim holds.
Using Table 4.2, we generate some possible configurations of graphs for MRS func-
tions in Figure 4.5. They suggest that the CCGs for the functions of the order greater than
three are generated by the union of CCGs of quadratic functions. However, when n = 5, the
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(a) n = 2
(b) n = 3
(c) n = 4
(d) n = 5
Figure 4.5: Isomorphic Cycle Combination Graph Classes n = 2 to 5
CCG K5 is generated by two cycles [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and [1, 3, 5, 2, 4], which are the CCGs of
x1x2(OSANF ) and x1x3(OSANF ), respectively, and they are isomorphic to each other.
This shows that generating quadratic functions may be isomorphic in their CCGs. Further-
more, Equation 4.3 suggests that we get a pair of edges from a quadratic function, which
generates the CCG by shifting n times through the vertices. This implies that the space of
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CCGs for n variable Boolean functions can be generated by the CCGs of quadratic func-
tions,
x1x2(OSANF ), x1x3(OSANF ), . . . , andx1xbn2 c(OSANF ).











This gives us the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.8. Given n ∈ N, the maximum number of CCGs of an n-variable MRS is
bounded above by 2bn2 c.
The bound in Lemma 4.3.8 cannot improve to equality, since we have cases where
some unions of the quadratic CCGs are impossible under certain conditions. We illustrate
this in the following example.
Example 4.3.9. In Figure 4.6, the sub-figures (b) through (d) form a basis for the graph
space for n = 6, which generates the rest of the CCG’s, the sub-figures (e) through (g).
We note that the configuration in Figure 4.7 is not a possible CCG. The graph is a
combination of Gc and Gd in Figure 4.6. Therefore, we have to use the edges connecting
two numbers apart by 2 or 3. This implies that we cannot complete a cycle in Figure 4.7
without violating the order structure of CCG. In other words, it is equivalent to a partition
on six identical objects with parts of two and three only, which is impossible. So far, we
focused on the fact that the difference between the indices of variables generate two edges
at a vertex of the CCG. We note that we just need one of the two edges, and so we can
simplify the notion with the next definition.
Definition 4.3.10. Let f = x1xP2xP3 . . . xPd(OSANF ). Let ri be as in Equation 4.1.
The distance set of f , denoted by DS(f), is the set
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(a) Ga (b) Gb
(c) Gc (d) Gd
(e) Ge (f) Gf
(g) Gg
Figure 4.6: Cycle Combination Graphs n = 6
{ai|ai = min(ri, n− ri), 1 ≤ i ≤ d} .
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Figure 4.7: An Impossible CCG n = 6
We call ai a distance element of f .
It is clear that each ri generates, at most, one distance element.







Proof. If n is odd, by the construction of CCG and Definition 4.3.10, each distance element








However, if n is even, we consider two cases. If r is even, by the construction of CCG and













and the distance element
n
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generates only one edge (or two overlapping edges) while each






One of the characteristics of a quadratic MRS function f is that |DS(f)| = 1.
However, not every MRS function f with |DS(f)| = 1 is a quadratic function. The next
lemma addresses the case where a CCG of a quadratic MRS function is generated by a
non-quadratic function.
Lemma 4.3.12. Let f be an MRS function of n variable. Then there exists a quadratic
MRS function h such that
Gh = Gf
if and only if
f = x1xd(OSANF )
for some 2 ≤ d ≤ n or some non-quadratic MRS function f such that
|DS(f)| = 1.
Proof. (⇒) Assume the conclusion is not true. Then, we have |DS(f)| > 1. Since
|DS(f)| > 1 generates more than two edges at a vertex of Gf , there exists no quadratic
MRS function h such that
Gh = Gf ,
which is a contradiction.
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(⇐) If f = x1xd(OSANF ), the conclusion is immediate. If f 6= x1xd(OSANF )
and DS(f) = {k} for 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌈n
2
⌉
, we can set
h = x1xk(OSANF ).
Example 4.3.13. Let n = 6, and
f1 = x1x2(OSANF )
f2 = x1x2x3x4x5x6(OSANF )
h1 = x1x3(OSANF )
h2 = x1x3x5(OSANF ).
Clearly, we have
|DS(f1)| = |DS(f2)| = |DS(h1)| = |DS(h2)| = 1,
Gf1 = Gf2
and
Gh1 = Gh2 .
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Lemma 4.3.14. Let f = x1xixk(OSANF ) be a cubic MRS function of n variables. Let a,
b, and c be distance elements of x1xi(OSANF ), x1xk−i+1(OSANF ), and x1xk(OSANF ),
respectively. Then, the following statements are true:
(1) If a 6= b, a 6= c, and b 6= c, then
Gf = G‖x1xi‖ ∪G‖x1xk−i+1‖ ∪G‖x1xk‖.
(2) If a 6= b and b = c, or a 6= b and a = c, then
Gf = G‖x1xi‖ ∪G‖x1xk−i+1‖.
(3) If a = b and b 6= c, then
Gf = G‖x1xi‖ ∪G‖x1xk‖.
(4) If a = b = c, then
Gf = G‖x1xi‖.
Proof. For all instances, it is clear that
V (Gf ) = V (G‖x1xi‖) = V (G‖x1xk−i+1‖) = V (G‖x1xk‖).
So we focus on the equality of the edge sets.
(1) Since a 6= b, a 6= c, and b 6= c, an arbitrary vertex m has the edges
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{m, m± a (mod n)}
{m, m± b (mod n)}
{m, m± c (mod n)}.
Also, each distance element generates a unique corresponding edge set. We have
{{j, j + a (mod n)}|1 ≤ j ≤ n} = E(G‖x1xi‖)
{{j, j + b (mod n)}|1 ≤ j ≤ n} = E(G‖x1xk−i+1‖)
{{j, j + c (mod n)}|1 ≤ j ≤ n} = E(G‖x1xk‖).
Therefore,
E(Gf ) = E(G‖x1xi‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk−i+1‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk‖),
and the claim holds.
(2) Since a 6= b and b = c (or a 6= b and a = c), an arbitrary vertex m has the edges
{m, m± a (mod n)}
{m, m± b (mod n)},
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Since the distance elements generate the following edges,
{{j, j + a (mod n)}|1 ≤ j ≤ n} = E(G‖x1xi‖)
{{j, j + b (mod n)}|1 ≤ j ≤ n} = E(G‖x1xk−i+1‖).
Therefore,
E(Gf ) = E(G‖x1xi‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk−i+1‖),
and the claim holds.
(3) The proof is similar to the one for (2).
(4) Since a = b = c, an arbitrary vertex m has the edges
{m, m± a (mod n)}.
The distance element generates the following edges
{{j, j + a (mod n)}|1 ≤ j ≤ n} = E(G‖x1xi‖).
Therefore,
E(Gf ) = E(G‖x1xi‖),
and the claim holds.
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When we create another MRS by adding another variable, we can increase the car-
dinality of the distance set by at most two. Using this, we further generalize the idea of
Lemma 4.3.14.
Lemma 4.3.15. Let f = x1xixj(OSANF ) and h = x1xixjxk(OSANF ) be MRS func-
tions of n variable. Let a, b, and c be distance elements of x1xj(OSANF ), x1xk−j+1(OSANF ),
and x1xk(OSANF ), respectively. Then, the following statements are true:
(1) If DS(h) = DS(f), then
Gh = Gf
(2) If |DS(h)| = |DS(f)|+ 1, and a is a redundant distance element of f , then,
b = c
and
Gh = Gf ∪G‖x1xk‖.
(3) If |DS(h)| = |DS(f)|+ 1 and a is not a redundant distance element of f ,
b 6= c
and
Gh = Gf ∪G‖x1xk−j+1‖ ∪G‖x1xk‖ −G‖x1xj‖.




Gh = Gf ∪G‖x1xk−j+1‖ ∪G‖x1xk‖ −G‖x1xj‖.
Proof. For all instances, the function h is obtained by removing the distance element a and
adding the distance elements b and c. We can construct Gh from Gf , tracking the changes
from DS(f) to DS(h). Clearly,
V (Gf ) = V (Gh).
We also have a general construction of the edge set of Gh.
E(Gh) = E(Gf ) ∪ E(G‖x1xk−j+1‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk‖)− E(G‖x1xj‖).
(1) Since DS(h) = DS(f), we have
E(Gf ) = E(Gf )− E(G‖x1xj‖),
and
E(Gf ) ⊇ E(G‖x1xk−j+1‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk‖).
Therefore,
E(Gf ) = E(Gh).
(2) Since a is a redundant distance element of f ,
E(Gf ) = E(Gf )− E(G‖x1xj‖).




Gh = Gf ∪G‖x1xk‖.
(3) Since a is not a redundant distance element of f ,
E(Gf ) ⊃ E(Gf )− E(G‖x1xj‖).
Additionally, |DS(h)| = |DS(f)|+ 1. So, we have to have b 6= c. Therefore,
E(Gh) = E(Gf )− E(G‖x1xj‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk−j+1‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk‖).
(4) If a is not a redundant distance element, or b 6= c , we haveDS(h) = DS(f)+1
at most, which is a contradiction. Clearly,
E(Gh) = E(Gf )− E(G‖x1xj‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk−j+1‖) ∪ E(G‖x1xk‖),
and the claim follows.
We extend Lemma 4.3.15 to the next theorem, whose proof is omitted, since it is
somewhat similar.
Theorem 4.3.16. Let f = x1xi2xi3 · · ·xi(k−1)xik(OSANF ) and h = x1xi2xi3 · · ·xikxi(k+1)
(OSANF ) be MRS functions of n variables. Let a, b, and c be distance elements of
x1xik(OSANF ), x1xi(k+1)−ik+1(OSANF ), and x1xi(k+1)(OSANF ), respectively. Then,
the following statements are true:
(1) If DS(h) = DS(f), then
Gh = Gf .
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(2) If |DS(h)| = |DS(f)|+ 1, and a is a redundant distance element of f , then,
b = c
and
Gh = Gf ∪G‖x1xi(k+1)‖.
(3) If |DS(h)| = |DS(f)|+ 1 and a is not a redundant distance element of f ,
b 6= c
and
Gh = Gf ∪G‖x1xi(k+1)−ik+1‖ ∪G‖x1xi(k+1)‖ −G‖x1xik‖.
(4) If |DS(h)| = |DS(f)|+ 2, then a is a redundant distance element of f ,
b 6= c,
and
Gh = Gf ∪G‖x1xi(k+1)−ik+1‖ ∪G‖x1xi(k+1)‖ −G‖x1xik‖.
The following theorems can be proved by fundamental number- and graph-theoretic
techniques.
Theorem 4.3.17. Let f be an MRS function of n variables. If Gf is disconnected, then
1 /∈ DS(f), and every element in DS(f) divides n.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. First, if 1 ∈ DS(f), Gf clearly contains the cycle
[1, 2, . . . , n]. Therefore, it is connected, which is a contradiction. Also, if there exists a
distance element a of f such that a - n, a is a generator of the group Zn with respect to
addition modulo n. And, we see that the following set of edges form Cn:
95
{{1, 1 + a}, {1 + a, 1 + 2a mod n}, . . . {1 + (n− 1)a mod n, 1 + na mod n}}
= {{1, 1 + a}, {1 + a, 1 + 2a mod n}, . . . {1 + (n− 1)a mod n, 1}}.
This contradicts the fact that Gf is disconnected, since Cn ∈ Gf implies Gf is connected.
Figure 4.8: CCG of f = x1x3x6x9(OSANF )
The converse of the previous theorem does not hold, since there are instances where
we can form a connected CCG with the nonzero distance elements that divide n. For
example, let n = 12. Then, f = x1x3x6x9(OSANF ) has 1 /∈ DS(f) = {2, 3, 4} and
2|12, 3|12 and 4|12. However, Gf is connected, as seen on Figure 4.8. Next, we present a
case where a CCG happens to be a complete graph.
Theorem 4.3.18. Let f be an MRS function of n variables. Then, Gf is complete if and
only if DS(f) = {1, 2, . . . , ⌊n
2
⌋}.
Proof. (⇒) Since Gf is regular, we make a case for the vertex 1. Since Gf is complete,
vertex 1 is incident to the set of edges edges
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{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n}}.
By Definition 4.3.10,
DS(f) = {min(2− 1, n− 1− 2),min(3− 1, n− 1− 3), . . .min(n− 1, n− n+ 1)}





(⇐) By definition 4.3.10, the vertex 1 has a set of edges





= {{1, 1}, {1, 2}, . . . , {1, n}}.





Proof. By Theorem 4.3.18, |DS(f)| = ⌊n
2
⌋
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5. TWO CONSTRUCTIONS OF BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS WITH
GOOD CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROPERTIES
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The two key factors in designing cryptographic Boolean functions are security and
speed. We achieve security by having good measures in as many cryptographic properties
as possible for the Boolean functions in a cipher, such as balancedness to resist statistical
attacks, high nonlinearity to address linear cryptanalysis, high algebraic degree against al-
gebraic attacks, correlation immunity and resilience to deal with correlation attacks, and
algebraic immunity to resist (fast) algebraic attacks. Speed is another important aspect,
since we desire fast encryption and decryption. For example, the Carlet–Feng function has
good cryptographic properties, but compared to other functions, it is not simple to gener-
ate or implement. This may cause certain ciphers to underperform. Security and speed
often conflict with each other, since higher security usually implies slower speed. Here
we present two constructions for good cryptographic Boolean functions, using a crypto-
graphically strong base function, and three simple Boolean operations, namely affine trans-
formation, concatenation, and complementation. One of the significant benefits from this
construction is the flexibility to choose a base function with customizable cryptographic
properties. We achieve security from the inherent qualities of the base function and ob-
tain speed by the simple Boolean operations. In Chapter 6, we give applications for our
constructions. This chapter is based on Chung, Stanica, Tan, and Wang [27].
5.2. CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOOLEAN FUNC-
TIONS




Given two base Boolean functions of f and g, both belonging to Bn, we can con-
struct another Boolean function, h ∈ Bn+1, by concatenating their truth tables. We note
that since the new function has to have 2n+1 elements in its truth table, the two functions
concatenated must have the same number of variables or be the same length. To illustrate
this point, if h = f ‖ g, h ∈ Bk, f ∈ Bk1, and Bk2 with k1, k2 ∈ N and k1 6= k2, we
have 2k = 2k1 + 2k2 = 2k1(1 + 2k1−k2). This implies 2k has an odd factor, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, we provide the following preposition.
Proposition 5.2.1. Let f and g be two Boolean functions. If h = f ‖ g, then f and g have
the same number of variables.
Concatenating two Boolean functions introduces a new variable to the ANF of the
concatenated function. The following useful lemma illustrates how we can obtain the ANF
of the new function from the ANFs of the base functions.
Lemma 5.2.2. Let f, g ∈ Bn−1. If h = f ‖ g with h ∈ Bn, then
h(x) = (xn ⊕ 1)f(xn−1)⊕ xng(xn−1),
where xn−1 = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1) and x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
Example 5.2.3. We illustrate Lemma 5.2.2 with two functions f and g on Table 5.1. We
can convert the truth tables to ANFs as below.
f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x1x2x3
g(x) = 1⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x1x2x3
We confirm the following equation of ANFs of the functions using Lemma 5.2.2
and Table 5.2.
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x3 x2 x1 f(x) g(x)
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0
Table 5.1: Truth Table of f and g
h(x) = (x4 ⊕ 1)f(xn−1)⊕ x4g(xn−1)
= x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x2x4 ⊕ x1x2x3 ⊕ x1x2x4 ⊕ x1x3x4
x4 x3 x2 x1 h(x)
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0
x4 x3 x2 x1 h(x)
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
Table 5.2: Truth Table of h = f ‖ g
The following theorem by Siegenthaler shows that a technique as simple as con-
catenation can be used to preserve certain cryptographic properties.
Theorem 5.2.4. [23] If Boolean functions f, g ∈ Bn have correlation immunity of order
k, then h = f ‖ g has correlation immunity of order k.
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5.2.2. Kronecker Product
The Kronecker product is a matrix operation that takes two matrices of arbitrary
size and outputs a block matrix.
Definition 5.2.5. Given A = {aij}, an m × n matrix and B = {brs}, a p × q matrix. The
Kronecker product of A and B, denoted by A⊗B is an mp× nq matrix,
A⊗B =

a11B · · · a1nB
... . . .
...




a11b11 · · · a1nb1q
... . . .
...
am1bp1 · · · amnbpq
 .
The Kronecker product can be used to generate a higher-dimensional bent functions
from a base bent function.
Theorem 5.2.6. [67] Let a 4k-dimensional column vector x represent the truth table of a
bent function with k = 1, 2, . . .. Then,
z = x⊗ x
is a bent function expressed in a 16k2-dimensional column vector.
In another example, the Kronecker product is a key concept to prove the following
theorem, which addresses a construction of bent function.
Theorem 5.2.7. [67] Let two Boolean functions f and g such that f : Fn2 −→ F2 and g :
Fm2 −→ F2. Then the Boolean function h : Fn+m2 −→ F2, defined by h(z) = f(x) ⊕ g(y)
with z = x‖y is bent if and only if f and g are bent.
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This theorem shows how a Boolean function of 2k variables, f(x) = x1x2⊕x3x4⊕
· · · ⊕ x2k−1x2k with k ≥ 1 is bent. The direct-sum method is a key component of various
bent function constructions including the constructions of Maiorana and McFarland [68],
[69], and Carlet [70], [71], and Canteaut et al. [30].
5.2.3. Affine Operations
We can integrate various operations that are conceptually linear to a construction
method to have significant effects. For example, linear transformation of variables, com-
plemetation of domain or function values, and adding polynomials are frequently used for
construction and analysis.
Example 5.2.8. If a Boolean function f is bent, then f ⊕ l is bent for any affine function
l [4, p. 83]. Let A be an n × n invertible matrix over F2 and v ∈ Fn2 . If a Boolean
function f of n variables is bent, then g(x) = f(Ax ⊕ v) is bent [4, p. 84]. Therefore,
h(x) = f(Ax⊕ v)⊕ l is bent as well.
5.3. TWO CONSTRUCTIONS TO ADDRESS SECURITY AND SPEED
We introduce two constructions [27] based on functions fi ∈ Bn−2 where i =
1, 2, . . ..
Construction 1.
For {i, j} = {1, 2}, we define the functions on Fn2 :
fi ‖ fj ‖ fi ‖ f¯j; fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ‖ fj; fi ‖ f¯j ‖ fi ‖ fj; f¯i ‖ fj ‖ fi ‖ fj;
fi ‖ fj ‖ fj ‖ f¯i; fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯j ‖ fi; fi ‖ f¯j ‖ fj ‖ fi; f¯i ‖ fj ‖ fj ‖ fi.
Construction 2.
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For {i, j} = {1, 2}, we define the functions on Fn2 :
fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ‖ f¯j; fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯j ‖ f¯i; f¯i ‖ f¯j ‖ fi ‖ fj; f¯i ‖ f¯j ‖ fj ‖ fi.
We observe that some functions in the constructions are affine equivalent to each
other. For example, given two functions u and v of n− 1 variables with x ∈ Fn2 ,
(u ‖ v¯)(x) = (xn ⊕ 1)u⊕ xn(v ⊕ 1)
= (xn ⊕ 1)u⊕ xnv ⊕ xn
= (u ‖ v)(x)⊕ xn
by Definition 3.2.1. Therefore,
u ‖ v ∼ u ‖ v¯.
Also,
(u ‖ v)(x) = ((v||u)(x⊕ (0, . . . , 0, 1))
due to the lexicographical order of domain. So we have
u ‖ v ∼ v ‖ u,
where ∼ signifies affine equivalence.
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By setting u = fi ‖ fj and v = fi ‖ f¯j , it is clear that u ‖ v = fi ‖ fj ‖ fi ‖ f¯j
is affine equivalent to u ‖ v¯ = fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ‖ fj . By similar arguments, we have for
Construction 1,
fi ‖ fj ‖ fi ‖ f¯j ∼

fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ‖ fj
fi ‖ f¯j ‖ fi ‖ fj
f¯i ‖ fj ‖ fi ‖ fj
and
fi ‖ fj ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ∼

fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯j ‖ fi
fi ‖ f¯j ‖ fj ‖ fi
f¯i ‖ fj ‖ fj ‖ fi
.
For Construction 2,
fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ‖ f¯j = f¯i ‖ f¯j ‖ fi ‖ fj ⊕ 1
and
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fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯j ‖ f¯i = f¯i ‖ f¯j ‖ fj ‖ fi ⊕ 1,
Therefore, we have
fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ‖ f¯j ∼ f¯i ‖ f¯j ‖ fi ‖ fj
and
fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯j ‖ f¯i ∼ f¯i ‖ f¯j ‖ fj ‖ fi.
There have been some constructions which use some components of our construc-
tions. For example, the bentness, the resiliency, and the normality properties of concate-
nated bent functions were considered in [72, 73]. The normality of f1 ‖ f2 ‖ f2 ‖ f¯1
for arbitrary function fi with i = 1, 2 is mentioned in [74]. Our constructions address
the instance where fi’s are affine equivalent to each other, and we cover other configura-
tions. Moreover, we explore more than the normality of the functions. f ∈ Bn satisfies
the high degree product (HDP) of order n if, for any non-annihilating function g of degree
1 ≤ e ≤ dn/2e − 1, the degree d = deg(gf) satisfies e + d ≥ n [75]. In [75], Pasalic
introduced a concatenation of four functions which requires each function to have maxi-
mum algebraic immunity, to show that the notion of HDP can measure resistance to fast
algebraic attacks.
Remark 5.3.1. In [76], Wang et al. demonstrated that the construction based on a four-
function concatenation in [75] does not always produce HDP function.
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5.4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROPERTIES OF THE TWO CONSTRUCTIONS
We start with algebraic immunity and nonlinearity. To set the stage for these prop-
erties, we take a look at the Walsh-Hadamard transform of the functions. The relationship
between Walsh-Hadamard transform and the function formed by concatenating two or four
functions of the same variables are well known. We generalize the relationship and present
the next lemma, which describes the Walsh-Hadamard coefficients of g (in some dimen-
sion) to the Walsh-Hadamard coefficients of its 2−k (k ≥ 1) concatenated parts.





Wg(u, un+1, . . . , un+r)





where r ∈ N, a(k) is the kth lexicographically ordered vector in Fr2, and u′ = (un+1, . . . , un+r).












= Wg1(u) + (−1)un+1Wg2(u).
For the induction hypothesis, we assume,
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where g′ = f2r+1(x)‖f2r+2(x)‖ · · · ‖f2r+1(x).
Then, we have
Wg′′(u, un+1, . . . , un+r+1)
= Wg(u, un+1, . . . , un+r) + (−1)un+r+1Wg′(u, un+1, . . . , un+r)





which shows our result.
The next lemma shows what happens to algebraic immunity when XORing two
functions.
Lemma 5.4.2. [77, Lemma 1] For any f ∈ Bn and any l ∈ An,
AI(f)− 1 ≤ AI(f ⊕ l) ≤ AI(f) + 1.
In general, for any f ∈ Bn and any function h ∈ Bn with deg(h) = k,
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AI(f)− k ≤ AI(f ⊕ h) ≤ AI(f) + k.
The next lemma shows how algebraic immunity behaves when concatenating two
functions.
Lemma 5.4.3. [77, Proposition 1] Let g1, g2 be two Boolean functions in the variables
x1, . . . , xn with AI(g1) = d1, AI(g2) = d2, and let g = (1 ⊕ xn+1)g1 ⊕ xn+1g2 ∈ Bn+1.
Then, the following hold:
If d1 6= d2, then AI(g) = min{d1, d2}+ 1.
If d1 = d2(=: d), then d ≤ AI(g) ≤ d + 1. Further, AI(g) = d if and only if
there exists f1, f2 ∈ Bn of algebraic degrees d that either both annihilate g1, g2, or both
annihilate g¯1, g¯2, and deg(f1 ⊕ f2) ≤ d− 1.
For our next result, we let f1 ∈ Bn−2 in Construction 1 and 2 be any balanced
function and f2(x) = f1(Ax⊕ b), where A is an (n− 2) by (n− 2) invertible matrix over
F2 and b is an (n− 2) dimensional vector over F2. We note that, since f1 and f2 are affine
equivalent, we have deg(f1) = deg(f2), AI(f1) = AI(f2) and nl(f1) = nl(f2).
Theorem 5.4.4. [27] Let f ∈ Bn be given by Constructions 1 or 2. f1, f2 ∈ Bn−2 are
nonconstant and affine equivalent. Then, f is balanced.
deg(f) = max{deg(f1), deg(f1 ⊕ f2) + 1},
and
AI(f) ≥ min{AI(f1||f2), AI(f1||f¯2)} ≥ AI(f1).
Moreover,
nl(f) = 2n−2 + 2nl(f1),
for functions in Construction 1, and
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nl(f) = 4nl(f1),
for functions in Construction 2.
Proof. We prove the result for Constuction 1 for two cases, since the others are similar.
First, let f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2 . We observe that
f = (xn ⊕ 1)(f1 ‖ f2)⊕ xn(f1 ‖ f¯2)
= (xn ⊕ 1)((xn−1 ⊕ 1)f1 ⊕ xn−1f2)
⊕xn((xn−1 ⊕ 1)f1 ⊕ xn−1(f2 ⊕ 1))
= xn−1f1 ⊕ f1 ⊕ xn−1f2 ⊕ xnxn−1
= (f1 ‖ f2)⊕ xnxn−1.
Since f1 and f2 are nonconstant,
deg(f) = deg(f1||f2)
= max{deg(f1), deg(f1 ⊕ f2) + 1}.
Since
(f1||f¯2)(xn−1) = (f1||f2)(xn−1)⊕ xn−1,
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where xn−1 = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1), by Lemma 5.4.2,
|AI(f1||f2)− AI(f1||f¯2)| ≤ 1.
So, we check two possibilities.
If AI(f1||f2) = AI(f1||f¯2), by Lemma 5.4.3
AI(f) ≥ AI(f1||f2) ≥ AI(f1).
If |AI(f1||f2)− AI(f1||f¯2)| = 1, then Lemma 5.4.3 shows that
AI(f) = min{d, d+ 1}+ 1 = d+ 1,
where min{AI(f1||f2), AI(f1||f¯2)} = d.
Second, let f = f1||f2||f2||f¯1. Then,
f = (xn ⊕ 1)(f1 ‖ f2)⊕ xn(f2 ‖ f¯1)
= xn−1f1 ⊕ f1 ⊕ xn−1f2 ⊕ xnf1 ⊕ xnf2 ⊕ xnxn−1
= (f1 ‖ f2)⊕ xn(f1 ⊕ f2 ⊕ xn−1).
So, we have
deg(f) = deg(f1||f2)
= max{deg(f1), deg(f1 ⊕ f2) + 1}.
111
The algebraic immunity computation does not change in this case.
To find the nonlinearity, we consider only f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2 of Construction1 since
the proofs for the other cases are similar. Using Lemma 5.4.1, we obtain
Wf (u, un−1, un) = Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1Wf2(u)
+(−1)unWf1(u) + (−1)un−1+unWf¯2(u)
= (1 + (−1)un)Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1 (1− (−1)un)Wf2(u).
Thus, Wf (u, un−1, 0) = 2Wf1(u) and Wf (u, un−1, 1) = 2(−1)un−1Wf2(u). It follows that
max
(u,un−1,un)∈Fn2
|Wf (u, un−1, un)| = 2 max
u∈Fn−22
|Wf1(u)| = 2n−1 − 4nl(f1)).
Therefore,
nl(f) = 2n−2 + 2nl(f1).
Next, we take two cases of Construction 2, as they are slightly different. The other
cases are similar to these.
Case 1. Let f = f1||f2||f¯1||f¯2. As above,
Wf (u, un−1, un) = Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1Wf2(u)
+(−1)unWf¯1(u) + (−1)un−1+unWf¯2(u)
= (1− (−1)un)Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1 (1− (−1)un)Wf2(u)
= (1− (−1)un) (Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1Wf2(u)) .
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Case 2. Let f = f1||f2||f¯2||f¯1. Then,




1− (−1)un−1+un)Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1 (1− (−1)un−1+un)Wf2(u)
=
(
1− (−1)un+un−1) (Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1Wf2(u)) .
Regardless of the case, we see that for Construction 2, we have
max
(u,un−1,un)∈Fn2
|Wf (u, un−1, un)| = 4 max
u∈Fn−22
|Wf1(u)|
= 2n − 8nl(f1)),
which renders
nl(f) = 4nl(f1).
We note that the nonlinearity in Construction 1 is much better than that of Con-
struction 2 with n ≥ 3. It is attributed to the following reasoning. Since f1 ∈ Bn−2,
nl(f1) ≤ 2n−3 − 2n/2−2 < 2n−3.
Therefore,
nl(f) = 2n−2 + 2nl(f1) > 4nl(f1).
As for the algebraic immunity, in most cases, deg(f1(xA ⊕ b) ⊕ f1) = deg(f1). That is,
deg(f) = deg(f1) + 1. By Lemma 5.4.3, it is usually the case that
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AI(f1||f2) = AI(f1) + 1.
That is,
AI(f) ≥ AI(f1) + 1.
Also, we note nl(f) is much better than nl(f1). Additionally, the fast correlation attack on








is the the bias of























This shows our constructions improve against correlation attacks when compared to the
base function.
Proposition 5.4.5. [75, Proposition 1] Let f = f1 ‖ f2 ‖ f3 ‖ f4 be an element of Bn+2




















which shows that f has maximum algebraic immunity.
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Using Proposition 5.4.5, we can further infer that if we take f1, f2 ∈ Bn with
n even of maximum AI , with the property that for any function g of algebraic degree




− 1, we have deg(f1g) = d ≥ AI(f1) and e+ d ≥ n, then f = f1||f2||f¯1||f2
has maximum AI . The Boolean functions with maximum algebraic immunity are called
perfect algebraic immune (PAI) [78]. Liu et al. introduced the notion of PAI and showed
that if f1 is a balanced PAI, then n = 2k + 1 for some k; if f1 is unbalanced, then n = 2k,
for some k [78, Theorem 7]. Next, we present the results related to normality of our
constructions.
Theorem 5.4.6. [27] Let fi, fj ∈ Bn−2. If fi or fj , whichever does not have its comple-
mentation in Construction 1, is k-normal, then the functions f of Construction 1 are at
least (k + 1)-normal.
Proof. Due to the affine equivalence to fi, fj is k-normal. If fi is invariant, say 0 on a
k-dimensional flat, then f¯i is invariant with 1 on the same flat, which shows that f¯i is k-
normal. We prove for the case f = fi‖fj‖fi‖f¯j only, since the others can be shown by
similar arguments. We show the existence of a (k + 1)-dimensional affine subspace where
f(x) is a constant. Let z1, . . . zk ∈ be k distinct, linearly independent vectors in Fn−22 ,
d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn−2) be a vector in Fn−22 , and ai ∈ F2 be for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We define a k-
dimensional flat G = {x ∈ Fn−22 | x = a1z1 +a2z2 + · · ·+akzk +d, ai = F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
such that fi|G = 0. In construction of f , we integrate two variables, xn−1 and xn into the
domain of fi, and we can construct a (k + 1)-dimensional flat in the following way. Let
zl = (zl1, zl2, . . . , zl(n−2)) where 1 ≤ l ≤ k. We set
z′l = (zl1, zl2, . . . , zl(n−2), 0, 0),
z′k+1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1),
and
d′ = (d1, d2, . . . , dn−2, 0, 0)
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where z′k+1, d
′ ∈ Fn2 . Then
G′ = {x′ ∈ Fn2 | x′ = a1z′1 + a2z′2 + · · ·+ ak+1z′k+1 + d′, ai = F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1}.
If a vector x′ ∈ G′ with ak+1 = 0, then f follows the first fi in the construction. If a vector
x′ ∈ G′ with ak+1 = 1, then f follows the third fi in the construction. Therefore, G′ is a
(k + 1)-dimensional flat such that f |G′ = 0.
Generally, it is difficult to establish a proper limit to the normality of a function. Let
fi or fj , whichever does not have its complementation in Construction 1, be k-normal but
not k+1-normal, and we show that the function f of Construction 1 cannot have a constant
function value on the k + 2-dimensional flat H = {a1ei1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ak+2eik+2 ⊕ d}, where
d = (y1, . . . yn) is a fixed vector in Fn2 and eim = (x1, . . . , xn) is an elementary vector such
that xj = 1 if and only if j = im with 1 ≤ im ≤ n. We assume f = fi‖fj‖fi‖f¯j since the
others can be shown by similar arguments. Let us also assume that H exists. We observe
that yim is irrelevant (whether it is 0 or 1) due to eim , so we set dwith yi1 = . . . = yik+2 = 0.
To illustrate better, we rewrite the restriction of our function to H as follows:
f(x)|H = (x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj)‖(x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1f¯j) |H
= x¯n(x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj)⊕ xn(x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1f¯j) |H
= x¯n−1(x¯nfi ⊕ xnfi)⊕ xn−1(x¯nfj ⊕ xnf¯j) |H
= fi ⊕ xn−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj ⊕ xn−1xn |H .
Without loss of generality, we assume f(x) = 0 for all x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ H , and
we examine the following cases, depending upon the values of xn−1 and xn.
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Case 1: n − 1, n /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then xn−1 = dn−1, and dn = xn. We observe that
for all possible values for xn−1 and xn, f |H is one of the functions, fi, fj , or f¯j . Since each
function is only k-normal, there exists at least one x ∈H such that f(x)|H = 1, which is a
contradiction.
Case 2: n − 1 /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2} and xn ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then xn−1 = dn−1. If
xn−1 = 0, then regardless of the value of xn, f |H follows the function, fi. We note that we
can only increase the normality to k + 1 using xn, since fi is k-normal. Therefore, there
exists at least one x ∈H such that f(x)|H = 1, which is a contradiction. If xn−1 = 1, f |H
follows the function, fj with xn = 0 or f¯j with xn = 1. Clearly, f |H is at most k-normal,
since f¯j = fj ⊕ 1. So, there exists at least one x ∈H such that f(x)|H = 1, which is a
contradiction.
Case 3: n /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2} and xn−1 ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then dn = xn. If xn = 0,
then f |H follows the function, fi‖fj . Also, if xn = 1, then f |H follows the function,
fi‖f¯j . In both instances, we can only increase the normality to k + 1, since fi, fj and f¯j
are k-normal.
Case 4: xn−1, xn ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. In this case f |H follows fi‖fj‖fi‖f¯j |H , and any two
vectors x′, x′′ ∈ H in the forms of x′ = (a1, . . . , an−2, 1, 0) and x′′ = (b1, . . . , bn−2, 1, 1)
with ai, bi ∈ F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 have opposite function values. Therefore, we have a
contradiction.
Under what conditions the functions of Construction 1 is k + 2-normal remains an
open problem. Using a similar approach, we can show a similar result for the functions of
Construction 2.
Theorem 5.4.7. [27] If fi is k-normal, then the functions f of Construction 2 are k or
k + 1-normal.
Proof. We prove for f = fi‖fj‖f¯i‖f¯j since the proofs for other cases are similar. Since fi
is k-normal, f is at least k-normal. Also we observe that if fi = fj , then we have
f = fi‖fi‖f¯i‖f¯i.
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Using the same technique in Theorem 5.4.6, we show the existence of a (k + 1)-
dimensional affine subspace where f(x) is a constant. Let z1, . . . zk ∈ be k distinct, linearly
independent vectors, d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn−2) be a vector in Fn−22 , and ai ∈ F2 be for 1 ≤ i ≤
k. We define a k-dimensional flatG = {x ∈ Fn−22 | x = a1z1 +a2z2 + · · ·+akzk+d, ai =
F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ k} such that fi|G = 0. In construction of f , we integrate two variables,
xn−1 and xn into the domain of fi, and we can construct a (k + 1)-dimensional flat in the
following way. Let zl = (zl1, zl2, . . . , zl(n−2)) where 1 ≤ l ≤ k. We set
z′l = (zl1, zl2, . . . , zl(n−2), 0, 0),
z′k+1 = (0, . . . , 1, 0),
and
d′ = (d1, d2, . . . , dn−2, 0, 0)
where z′k+1, d
′ ∈ Fn2 . Then
G′ = {x′ ∈ Fn2 | x′ = a1z′1 + a2z′2 + · · ·+ ak+1z′k+1 + d′, ai = F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1}.
If a vector x′ ∈ G′ with ak+1 = 0, then f follows the first fi in the construction. If a vector
x′ ∈ G′ with ak+1 = 1, then f follows the second fi in the construction. Therefore, G′ is a
k + 1-dimensional flat such that f |G′ = 0. Therefore, the theorem holds.
We also present a similar result on the normality of the functions of Construction 2.
Let fi in Construction 2 be k-normal but not k + 1-normal, and we show that the function
f of Construction 2 cannot have a constant function value on the k + 2-dimensional flat
H = {a1ei1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ak+2eik+2 ⊕ d}, where d = (y1, . . . yn) is a fixed vector in Fn2 and
eim = (x1, . . . , xn) is an elementary vector such that xj = 1 if and only if j = im with
1 ≤ im ≤ n. We assume f = fi‖fj‖f¯i‖f¯j , since the others can be shown by similar
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arguments. Let us also assume that H exists. We observe that yim is irrelevant (whether it
is 0 or 1) due to eim , so we set d with yi1 = . . . = yik+2 = 0. To illustrate better, we rewrite
the restriction of our function to H as follows:
f(x) |H = (x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj)‖(x¯n−1f¯i ⊕ xn−1f¯j) |H
= x¯n(x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj)⊕ xn(x¯n−1f¯i ⊕ xn−1f¯j) |H
= x¯n−1(x¯nfi ⊕ xnfi)⊕ xn−1(x¯nfj ⊕ xnfj)⊕ xn |H
= fi ⊕ xn−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj ⊕ xn |H .
Without loss of generality, we assume f(x) = 0 for all x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ H , and
we examine the following cases, depending upon the variables, xn−1 and xn.
Case 1: n − 1, n /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then xn−1 = dn−1, and dn = xn. We observe that,
for all possible values for xn−1 and xn, f |H follows one of the functions, fi, f¯i, fj , or f¯j .
Since each function is only k-normal, there exists at least one x ∈ H with f(x) = 1, a
contradiction. We note that the other instances where xn−1 = yim or xn = yim are covered
by the other cases.
Case 2: n − 1 /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2} and xn ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then xn−1 = dn−1. If
xn−1 = 0, f |H follows the function, fi or f¯i. We know each function is k-normal. Since fi
and f¯i have opposite function values in H , there exists at least one x ∈ H with f(x) = 1,
a contradiction. If xn−1 = 1, f |H follows fj , or f¯j , the same justification applies, and we
have a contradiction.
Case 3: n /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2} and xn−1 ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then dn = xn. If xn = 0,
then f |H follows the function, fi‖fj . If xn = 1, then f |H again follows the function, f¯i‖f¯j .
In either case, we can only have a k + 1-normal function, which is a contradiction.
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Case 4: xn−1, xn ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. In this case f |H follows f = fi‖fi‖f¯i‖f¯i. and any
two vectors x′, x′′ ∈ H in the forms of x′ = (a1, . . . , an−2, 0, 0) and x′′ = (b1, . . . , bn−2, 0, 1)
with ai, bi ∈ F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 have opposite function values. Therefore, we have a con-
tradiction.
Remark 5.4.8. References [73], and [74] contain the constructions of normal, or non-
normal functions based upon some of the functions of Construction 1, namely f1||f2||f2||f¯1,
where fi are bent or have some normality properties.
Finally, we investigate the propagation property of our construction.
Theorem 5.4.9. [27] If the base functions f1 and f2 in Construction 1 satisfy the strict
avalanche criterion, then f satisfies the strict avalanche criterion.
Proof. We recall that we add two variables xn−1 and xn when we concatenate the functions.
For every vector y ∈ Fn2 , write y = (yn−2, yn−1, yn) with yn−2 ∈ Fn−22 . We shall show
the claim for f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2, as all the other possibilities are similar. To apply Lemma
2.3.9, we check f ′ = f(x) ⊕ f(x ⊕ a) where a ∈ Fn2 of weight wt(a) = 1. We consider
three possible cases.
Case 1. Let a = (0, . . . , 0, 1). Then,
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ a) = (f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)x¯n ⊕ (f1||f¯2)(xn−2, xn−1)xn
⊕(f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)xn ⊕ (f1||f¯2)(xn−2, xn−1)x¯n
= (f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)⊕ (f1||f¯2)(xn−2, xn−1)
= 02n−2||12n−2 ‖ 02n−2||12n−2 ,
Clearly, it is a balanced function.
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Case 2. Take a = (0, . . . , 1, 0). Then
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ a)
= (f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)x¯n ⊕ (f1||f¯2)(xn−2, xn−1)xn
⊕(f1||f2)(xn−2, x¯n−1)x¯n ⊕ (f1||f¯2)(xn−2, x¯n−1)xn
= f1(xn−2)x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ f2(xn−2)xn−1x¯n ⊕ f1(xn−2)x¯n−1xn ⊕ f¯2(xn−2)xn−1xn
⊕f1(xn−2)xn−1x¯n ⊕ f2(xn−2)x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ f1(xn−2)xn−1xn ⊕ f¯2(xn−2)x¯n−1xn
= f1(xn−2)x¯n ⊕ f2(xn−2)x¯n ⊕ f1(xn−2)xn ⊕ f¯2(xn−2)xn
= f1(xn−2)⊕ f2(xn−2)⊕ xn.
which is balanced regardless of f1 ⊕ f2 is balanced or not.
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Case 3. Take a = (a′, 0, 0), with wt(a′) = 1. Write xa = xn−2 ⊕ a′. Then,
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ a)
= (f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)x¯n ⊕ (f1||f¯2)(xn−2, xn−1)xn
⊕(f1||f2)(xa, xn−1)x¯n ⊕ (f1||f¯2)(xa, xn−1)xn
= f1(xn−2)x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ f2(xn−2)xn−1x¯n ⊕ f1(xn−2)x¯n−1xn ⊕ f¯2(xn−2)xn−1xn
⊕f1(xa)x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ f2(xa)xn−1x¯n ⊕ f1(xa)x¯n−1xn ⊕ f¯2(xa)xn−1xn
= (f1(xn−2)⊕ f1(xa))x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ (f2(xn−2)⊕ f2(xa))xn−1x¯n
⊕(f1(xn−2)⊕ f1(xa))x¯n−1xn ⊕ (f¯2(xn−2)⊕ f¯2(xa))xn−1xn
= (f1(xn−2)⊕ f1(xa))x¯n−1 ⊕ (f2(xn−2)⊕ f2(xa))xn−1,
which is balanced. Since f1 and f2 satisfy the strict avalanche criterion, both f1(xn−2) ⊕
f1(xn−2 ⊕ a′) and f2(xn−2)⊕ f2(xn−2 ⊕ a′) are balanced. We note that f ′ is balanced for
all the cases. Then, we have
Cfˆ (u) = 0,
for all u ∈ Fn2 with wt(u) = 1. By Lemma 2.3.9, we conclude that f satisfies the SAC.
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Theorem 5.4.10. [27] With {i, j} = {1, 2}, if fi, fj satisfy the strict avalanche criterion
and fi⊕fj is balanced, then the functions of Construction 2 of the form fi||fj||f¯j||f¯i, f¯i||f¯j||fj||fi
satisfy the strict avalanche criterion.
Proof. For every vector y ∈ Fn2 , we write y = (yn−2, yn−1, yn) with yn−2 ∈ Fn−22 . We
show the claim in the case f = f1||f2||f¯2||f¯1, as all the other possibilities are similar. Let
a ∈ Fn2 of weight wt(a) = 1. We consider these three cases.
Case 1. Take a = (0, . . . , 0, 1). Then
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ a) = (f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)x¯n ⊕ (f¯2||f¯1)(xn−2, xn−1)xn
⊕(f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)xn ⊕ (f¯2||f¯1)(xn−2, xn−1)x¯n
= (f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)⊕ (f¯2||f¯1)(xn−2, xn−1)
= f1(xn−2)⊕ f2(xn−2)⊕ 1.
Since f1(xn−2)⊕ f2(xn−2) is balanced, its complement is balanced.
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Case 2. Take a = (0, . . . , 1, 0). Then
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ a)
= (f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)x¯n ⊕ (f¯2||f¯1)(xn−2, xn−1)xn
⊕(f1||f2)(xn−2, x¯n−1)x¯n ⊕ (f¯2||f¯1)(xn−2, x¯n−1)xn
= f1(xn−2)x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ f2(xn−2)xn−1x¯n ⊕ f¯2(xn−2)x¯n−1xn ⊕ f¯1(xn−2)xn−1xn
⊕f1(xn−2)xn−1x¯n ⊕ f2(xn−2)x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ f¯2(xn−2)xn−1xn ⊕ f¯1(xn−2)x¯n−1xn




Case 3. Take a = (a′, 0, 0), with wt(a′) = 1. Write xa = xn−2 ⊕ a′. Then,
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ a)
= (f1||f2)(xn−2, xn−1)x¯n ⊕ (f¯2||f¯1)(xn−2, xn−1)xn
⊕(f1||f2)(xa, xn−1)x¯n ⊕ (f¯2||f¯1)(xa, xn−1)xn
= f1(xn−2)x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ f2(xn−2)xn−1x¯n ⊕ f¯2(xn−2)x¯n−1xn ⊕ f¯1(xn−2)xn−1xn
⊕f1(xa)x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ f2(xa)xn−1x¯n ⊕ f¯2(xa)x¯n−1xn ⊕ f¯1(xa)xn−1xn
= (f1(xn−2)⊕ f1(xa))x¯n−1x¯n ⊕ (f2(xn−2)⊕ f2(xa))xn−1x¯n
⊕(f¯2(xn−2)⊕ f¯2(xa))x¯n−1xn ⊕ (f¯1(xn−2)⊕ f¯1(xa))xn−1xn
= (f1(xn−2)⊕ f1(xa))(1⊕ xn−1 ⊕ xn)⊕ (f2(xn−2)⊕ f2(xa))(xn−1 ⊕ xn)
= (f1(xn−2)⊕ f1(xa))‖(f2(xn−2)⊕ f2(xa))‖
(f2(xn−2)⊕ f2(xa))‖(f1(xn−2)⊕ f1(xa)).
Since f1 and f2 satisfy the strict avalanche criterion, both f1(xn−2)⊕f1(xa) and f2(xn−2)⊕
f2(xa) are balanced. Therefore, f in Case 3 is balanced. Since f ′ is balanced for all the
cases, we have
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Cfˆ (u) = 0,
for all u ∈ Fn2 with wt(u) = 1. By Lemma 2.3.9, we conclude that f satisfies the SAC.
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6. AN APPLICATION OF THE TWO CONSTRUCTIONS
6.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we show an application of the construction methods presented in
the previous chapter. In 2002, Krause [79] introduced an attack against stream ciphers
based on the binary decision diagram (BDD). Several researchers have demonstrated the
effectiveness of BDD-based attacks, and it has been difficult for functions with conven-
tional cryptographic properties to counter BDD-based attacks. Various BDD-based attacks
are found in [79], [80], [81], [82], and [83]. One way to counter BDD-based attacks is to
integrate Boolean functions with robust BDDs [79]. There have been many constructions
of Boolean functions with high algebraic immunity [77], [84], [85], [86], [87], [88], [89],
[90], [91], [92], [93], [94], [95], [96], [97], [98], [99], but few took BDD-based attacks into
consideration. In [100] and [101], Bryant showed that the hidden weighted-bit function
(HWBF) has an exponential size of BDD regardless of variable order, and in [98], Wang
et al. extensively investigated the cryptographic properties of HWBF. In this chapter, we
briefly introduce the concept of the BDD and apply our construction methods from the
previous chapter to HWBF. This chapter is based on Chung, Stanica, Tan, and Wang [27].
6.2. BINARY DECISION DIAGRAM (BDD)
We mention briefly relevant findings from [102, pp. 202–280], which covers BDDs
extensively. Essentially, a BDD is a tree that represents a perspective on a Boolean func-
tion in which redundant nodes are removed. The BDD is an insightful way to represent a
Boolean function, since it shows how the Boolean function data is stored and handled in a
computer memory system [102, p. 202]. There are various BDD definitions in technical
literature. Here, we assume the BDD has ordered vertices or nodes from the lowest at the
top to the highest at the bottom, and is reduced as we apply the reduction steps explained
below. We illustrate the BDD using an example from [102, pp. 202–205]. Let a Boolean
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function, f , be described as in Table 6.1. A graphical way to represent the truth table f is
using a tree structure shown Figure 6.1. We then apply a reduction algorithm on the tree,
in which we remove nodes that represent a function also represented by another node in
the BDD. Then we connect from the first x2 to any 0 node and from the second x2 to any
1 node. We note that two middle x3 nodes have the same function values, so we combine
them along with the edges from x2 nodes, which results in a BDD representation of f in
Table 6.2. A computer memory system can store f in four different memory blocks repre-
senting the nodes, and each block points to other nodes as indicated by the BDD [102, p.
203]. The size of the BDD, denoted by BDD(f) is the number of vertices in a BDD.
x = x1x2x3 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
f(x) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
Table 6.1: Truth Table of a Boolean Function f From [102, p. 205]
Figure 6.1: A Tree Representation of f
It is shown that every Boolean function has a unique BDD [102, p. 205]. The
following are some benefits of considering BDD in Boolean function analysis [102, p.
206].
1. From the structural point of view, we can evaluate f(x) in at most n steps by follow-
ing the edges from the root vertex.
128
Figure 6.2: BDD Representation of f
2. We can effectively identify the lexicographically smallest x such that f(x) = 1 or 0
in at most n steps.
3. We can find all x ∈ Fn2 such that f(x) = 1 or 0 in O(BDD(f) · n) steps.
4. We can efficiently generate random solutions to the equation f(x) = 1 such that each
solution gets generated in an equal probability.
5. We can solve the linear Boolean programming problem: Find x ∈ Fn2 such that
u1x1 ⊕ u2x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ unxn = 1,
subject to
f(x) = 1
with given constants (u1, u2, . . . , un) in O(n+BDD(f)) steps.
6.3. HIDDEN WEIGHTED-BIT FUNCTION (HWBF)
6.3.1. Definition of HWBF
In general, a HWBF hn takes x = (xn, xn−1, . . . , x1) as input and outputs xi , where
i = wt(x).




0, if wt(x) = 0
xwt(x), if wt(x) > 0
For example, we can evaluate h4(x4, x3, x2, x1) on F42 to obtain Table 6.2.


















Table 6.2: A HWBF with n = 4
We observe that h4(0110) = 1 since wt(0110) = 2 (so the second element of 0110 which
is 1 is the function value). Table 6.3 has the list of HWBFs upto n = 8.
One of the interesting characteristics of HWBFs is that they have a very large num-
ber of nodes when represented by a BDD [79]. Specifically,
BDD(hn) = cχ
n +O(n2),
where χ ≈ 1.3247 is the positive root of
χ3 = χ+ 1
and c ≈ 10.75115 [102, p. 206].
6.3.2. Affine Structure within HWBF
In order to implement our construction methods with HWBFs, we need a class of
functions affine equivalent to the HWBFs. It turned out that a HWBF hn is, in fact, a con-
catenation of hn−1 and one of it affine-equivalent functions. Let φ be the left-rotation sym-
metric operation on vectors of arbitrary dimension, say φ(xn, xn−1, . . . , x1) = (x1, . . . , x3, x2).
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Table 6.3: Hidden Weighted-Bit Functions
In [98], Wang et al. showed that the HWBF is a concatenation which can be iterated, as
shown in the next formula,
hn(x1,x, xn−1, xn) = hn−1(x1,x, xn−1)||(hn−1 ◦ φ)(x1,x, xn−1)
=hn−2(x1,x)||(hn−2 ◦ φ)(x1,x)||hn−2(x, xn−1)||(hn−2 ◦ φ)(x, xn−1)
= · · ·
(6.1)
where x = (x2, . . . , xn−2) ∈ Fn−22 . Noting this phenomenon, we define the function that
describes the latter half of the HWBF.
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Definition 6.3.2. Given the HWBF hn+1, the latter half function of hn+1, denoted by h′n is
h′n(x) =

1 if wt(x) = n
xwt(x)+1 if 0 ≤ wt(x) < n− 1.
On the other hand, we call the other half, the front half function, which is hn−1. So, we
have
hn+1 = hn‖h′n.
6.3.3. Cryptographic Properties of HWBF
Wang et al. extensively investigated the cryptographic properties of HWBFs in
[98]. We list their findings briefly. Given hn ∈ Bn where hn is an HWBF, the following
statements are true:
• hn is balanced.
• deg(hn) = n− 1 for n ≥ 3.
• hn satisfies SAC.

































Remark 6.3.3. We refer back to Table 6.3. We note the string of 1’s at the end of the truth
tables for each n. The pattern suggests that given n ≥ 5, we may have at least last n bits to
be 1. We ask if it is possible to exploit it. If an attack is possible, then what is the best way
to mitigate the risk?
6.4. CONSTRUCTION BASED ON HWBF
For our constructions, we let {fi, fj} = {hn−2, h′n−2}. Then, we have,
Construction 1.
fi ‖ fj ‖ fi ‖ f¯j; fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ‖ fj; fi ‖ f¯j ‖ fi ‖ fj; f¯i ‖ fj ‖ fi ‖ fj;
fi ‖ fj ‖ fj ‖ f¯i; fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯j ‖ fi; fi ‖ f¯j ‖ fj ‖ fi; f¯i ‖ fj ‖ fj ‖ fi.
Construction 2.
fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯i ‖ f¯j; fi ‖ fj ‖ f¯j ‖ f¯i; f¯i ‖ f¯j ‖ fi ‖ fj; f¯i ‖ f¯j ‖ fj ‖ fi.
Theorem 6.4.1. [27] Let n ≥ 4 and f1||f2 = hn−2 ‖ h′n−2 = hn−1, the (n− 1)- variables
HWBF. Then, all of the functions f from Construction 1 are balanced of degree max{n −
2, 2}, have nonlinearity














Proof. Clearly, all functions in Construction 1 are balanced since hn−2 and h′n−2 are bal-
anced. Furthermore, for any concatenation g1||g2 ∈ Bn where g1, g2 ∈ Bn−1,
deg(g1||g2) = max{deg(g1), deg(g1 ⊕ g2) + 1}
since
g1||g2 = (xn ⊕ 1)g1 ⊕ xng2
= xn(g1 ⊕ g2)⊕ g1.
Thus,
deg(f1||f2||f1||f¯2) = max{deg(f1||f2), deg((f1||f2)⊕ (f1||f¯2)) + 1}
= max{n− 2, deg(02n−212n−2) + 1}
= max{n− 2, 2},
where we write 0s, or 1s, for a truth table with the corresponding bit repeated s times.
Next, we do the computation for only one case. The others are similar. Let f =
f1||f2||f1||f¯2. We show that









We use Lemma 5.4.1, with g1 = hn−1 = f1||f2, g2 = f1||f¯2, f1 = hn−2, and
f2 = h
′
n−2. As in the proof of Theorem 5.4.4, we have
Wf (u, un−1, un) = (1 + (−1)un)Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1 (1− (−1)un)Wf2(u)
where u ∈ Fn−22 .
Thus,
Wf (u, un−1, 0) = 2Wf1(u)
and
Wf (u, un−1, 1) = 2(−1)un−1Wf2(u).










Equation 6.2, it follows that
max
(u,un−1,un)∈Fn2

















By Theorem 2.3.4, the nonlinearity of the functions in Construction 1 is








We now deal with the computation of the algebraic immunity for the considered
functions. By Theorem 4 of [98], let






Since hn ∼ h′n, we can construct an annihilator of h′n by the same affine transformation




By the definition of algebraic immunity,
AI(g) = AI(g¯)
for any Boolean function g, and also,
AI(fi||fj) = AI(fj||fi),
and by Lemma 5.4.3,
AI(fi||f¯j) = AI(f¯i||fj),
for {i, j} = {1, 2}.
So without loss of generality, we will only consider the case of f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2.
Let g = g1||g2||k1||k2 6= 0 be a nonzero annihilator of f . Thus, g1, k1 are both annihila-
tors of f1; and, g2, respectively, k2 are annihilators of f2, respectively, f¯2 such that each
annihilator is a nonzero function.
First, since g1||g2 is an annihilator of f1||f2 = hn−1, it follows that deg(g1||g2) = 0,
if both g1 = g2 = 0, or deg(g1||g2) ≥ dn−1. Also, we observe that deg(g1 ⊕ k1) is either
0, if g1 = k1 = 0 or g1 = k1 6= 0. Otherwise, deg(g1 ⊕ k1) ≥ dn−1, since g1 ⊕ k1 is an
annihilator of f1. Now, the degree of the concatenation g = g1||g2||k1||k2 is
deg(g) = max{deg(g1||g2), deg((g1 ⊕ k1)||(g2 ⊕ k2)) + 1}.
136
Next, we analyze the components of the set above. We see that
deg(g1||g2) = max{deg(g1), deg(g1 ⊕ g2) + 1},
and
deg((g1 ⊕ k1)||(g2 ⊕ k2)) = max{deg(g1 ⊕ k1), deg(g1 ⊕ g2 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2) + 1}.
If we minimize max{deg(g1⊕ k1), deg(g1⊕ g2⊕ k1⊕ k2)⊕ 1}, we have the worst
case when g1 = k1 and g2 = k2. Then,











Theorem 6.4.2. [27] Let n ≥ 3 and f1||f2 = hn−1, the (n− 1)-variables HWBF. All of the
functions f from Construction 2 are balanced, have degree n− 2, have nonlinearity













and have the resiliency of order 1.
Proof. The functions in Construction 2 are balanced regardless of the balancedness of f1
and f2 and their complements. We will consider only some cases, since the others follow
similarly. If there is a noteworthy difference, we will point it out as necessary. Let f =
f1||f2||f¯1||f¯2. Clearly,
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deg(f1||f2||f¯1||f¯2) = max{deg(f1||f2), deg((f1||f2)⊕ (f¯1||f¯2)) + 1}
= max{n− 2, deg(02n−1) + 1}
= max{n− 2, 1}.
= n− 2
for n ≥ 3. For the other possibilities, if f = f1||f2||f¯2||f¯1,
deg(f1||f2||f¯2||f¯1) = max{deg(f1||f2), deg((f1||f2)⊕ (f¯2||f¯1)) + 1}
= max{n− 2, deg((f1 ⊕ f¯2)||(f2 ⊕ f¯1)) + 1}
= max{n− 2, deg(f1 ⊕ f¯2) + 1}
= max{n− 2, n− 2}
= n− 2.
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Next, by Lemma 5.4.1 with g1 = hn−1 = f1||f2, g2 = f¯1||f¯2, f1 = hn−2, and
f2 = h
′
n−2, as in Theorem 5.4.4 we have
Wf (u, un−1, un) = (1− (−1)un)(Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1Wf2(u))
= (1− (−1)un)Whn−1(u, un−1),
where u ∈ Fn−22 . We now get
max
(u,un−1,un)∈Fn2







by Equation 6.2. Therefore, we have








To show resilience of order 1, we will prove that the functions in Construction
2 are correlation immune of order 1 since the function is already balanced. The case
of f1||f2||f¯1||f¯2, or f¯1||f¯2||f1||f2, is straightforward. Let f = f1||f2||f¯2||f¯1. To show
correlation immunity of order 1, we need to show that Wf (w) = 0 for any vector w
with wt(w) = 1 by Lemma 2.3.15. It turns out that this will follow simply by us-
ing the balancedness of f1 and f2 and not the HWBF property. By Lemma 5.4.1, if
wt(u, un−1, un) = 1, we have
Wf (u, un−1, un) =
(
1− (−1)un−1+un) (Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1Wf2(u)).
Now, if wt(un−1, un) = 1, then u = 0. Since f1 and f2 are balanced,
Wf1(u) = Wf2(u) = 0.
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If wt(un−1, un) = 0, we have
1− (−1)un−1+un = 0.
Therefore,
Wf (u, un−1, un) = 0,
where wt(wt(u, un−1, un) = 1, and the functions have the resiliency of order 1.
The computation of the algebraic immunity is similar to the one in the proof of
Theorem 6.4.1. Let f = f1||f2||f¯1||f¯2. We see that
AI(f1||f2) = AI(f¯1||f¯2).
Additionally, by the definition of algebraic immunity, the annihilator used to justify
the AI of f1||f2 or f¯1||f¯2 can be the same function. Let g = g1||g2 6= 0 be a nonzero
annihilator of f where g1, g2 ∈ Bn−1. The degree of the concatenation g = g1||g2 is
deg(g) = max{deg(g1), deg(g1 ⊕ g2)⊕ 1}.
We observe that this value takes a minimum when g1 = g2. So we have


















We see that Theorems 5.4.6 and 5.4.7 apply to the normality of the Construction 1
and 2 functions, respectively.
Example 6.4.3. We present a snapshot of a performance comparison between the base
function HWBF and a function of Construction 1. Let f = f1 ‖ f2 ‖ f1 ‖ f¯2. In Table 6.4,
one can find the algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of f , compared to the HWBF hn.
n AI(f) AI(h) nl(f) nl(hn)
7 3 3 52 44
8 4 4 104 88
9 4 4 216 186
10 5 4 432 372
11 5 5 884 772
12 5 5 1768 1544
13 6 5 3592 3172
14 6 5 7184 6344
15 6 6 14536 12952
Table 6.4: Algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of the HWBF-based f and the HWBF h
From [27]
As for the algebraic immunity, let fg = hn, deg(g) = d and deg(hn) = e. In Table
6.5, we present the lowest possible values of (d, e) needed for the fast algebraic attack.
n 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
(d, e) (1,3) (1,5) (1,5) (1,7) (1,7) (1,9) (1,9)
(2,4) (2,4) (2,4) (2,5) (2,6) (2,8) (2,8)
(3,3) (3,4) (3,4) (3,5) (3,5) (3,6) (3,6)
(4,5) (4,5) (4,6) (4,6)
(5,6)
Table 6.5: Behavior of the HWBF-based function f against Fast Algebraic Attacks From
[27]
Remark 6.4.4. We briefly mention some tentative results on our constructions with the
Carlet–Feng function. Let f1 ∈ B10 be the Carlet–Feng function with the primitive poly-
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nomial
x10 + x6 + x5 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1
and f2(x) = f1(Ax), where
A = (e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e10, e6, e7, e8, e9)
and ei ∈ F102 is the unit column vector with 1 on the i-th position and 0’s elsewhere.
Let f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2 ∈ B12. Then, we computed AI(f) = 6 and nl(f) = 1992. In
comparison, the nonlinearity of the 12-variable Carlet-Feng function discussed in [96] and
[97] is only 1970. Also, the recent 12-variable functions constructed by Construction 1
and 2 of [96] have the nonlinearity at most 1988 and 1982, respectively. Our constructions
compare well to competitive constructions with good cryptographic properties.
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we studied the affine equivalence of Boolean functions, the
relationship between Boolean functions and graphs, and the construction techniques of
Boolean functions and their applications. Affine equivalence of Boolean functions still re-
mains a tough challenge for researchers. We defined S-equivalence, a special type of affine
equivalence based on permutation of variables, and our research focused on S-equivalence
of MRS functions and circulant matrices of F2. We established a relationship between
MRS functions and the circulant matrices of F2. We explored the group structure of the
circulant matrices of F2 and found a pattern of the square of a circulant matrix of F2. This
pattern ultimately helped us to a series of properties of MRS functions of which circu-
lant matrices are singular, but have pseudo inverses. We showed a condition in terms of
generating polynomials for a singular circulant matrix in F2 to have a general or reflexive
inverse. We defined a dual function for an MRS function with respect to the inverse of the
circulant matrix of the function. We then showed that two S-equivalent functions have the
same degree in ANF, and their dual functions have the same degree. We also showed that
if two MRS functions of which circulant matrices are P-Q equivalent, they have the same
degree. Moreover, if the matrices are invertible, their dual functions have the same degree,
and a circulant matrix of one of the original functions is a permutation of the other.
We developed an idea to represent an MRS function in a graph using the cycles
generated by the ordered short algebraic normal form (OSANF) of the function. We illus-
trated that this graph is regular. We showed that the graph is ultimately determined by the
sequential differences of the indices of variables in OSANF. We described the relationship
between this property and the construction of MRS functions.
We considered two effective constructions of cryptographic Boolean functions, which
use a base function with strong cryptographic properties, one of its affine equivalent func-
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tions, and simple construction techniques, namely complementation and concatenation.
This strategy reinforces the two important requirements for cryptographic functions, namely
security and speed. Security is clearly a must requirement. However, if a cryptographic
function requires an unreasonable amount of computing power or hard-to-implement hard-
ware or software, it cannot be utilized effectively. We presented an application of the
constructions, using hidden weighted-bit functions.
In summary, we cleared some trenches on the way to a complete understanding of
the affine-equivalence problem of Boolean functions. We further presented two effective
constructions for cryptographic Boolean functions.
7.2. FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we explored various areas of Boolean functions. We solved
some related problems in the process, but we could not solve all the problems. We present
a partial list of problems worth considering.
1. Prove or disprove “If f s∼ g with singular matrices Af and Ag, and wt(∆(f)) =
wt(∆(g)), then wt(∆(f †)) = wt(∆(g†)), where f † and g† are pseudoinverses of f
and g, respectively”.
2. We propose a thorough analysis of the CCGs. More graph-theoretic, number-theoretic,
and combinatorial analyses can be done. One can also study the relationship between
the CCG and cryptographic properties. One can expand the concept of CCG and de-
velop a CCG-like structure for all RSBFs.
3. Extend the cryptographic analysis of Constructions 1 and 2 to GAC,..., etc. Study
more applications of the constructions using other functions.
4. The BDD of Boolean functions has an interesting set of operations. Their effects
on various cryptographic properties of Boolean functions would be a worthwhile
project.
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5. HWBFs seem to display predictable patterns in the second half of a truth table. An
interesting project will be to engineer another class of cryptographic Boolean func-
tions with high BBD size, but without the predictability.
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